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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, liberalisation of the mining sectors in Africa has resulted in 
a large influx of foreign mining companies, bringing them into conflict with existing primitive 
artisanal mining activities, which is an important livelihood strategy on the continent. 
This study focuses on the conflict around the North Mara Gold Mine situated in the north-
western Tanzania, one of the most severe and violent cases of conflict between artisanal 
miners and a mining company in the world. This study seeks to find the causes of this conflict 
and identifies three stakeholders in the conflict; the artisanal miners in the area, the mining 
company African Barrick Gold operating the mine, and the Tanzanian government, which all 
claim access to the gold. 
The sparse academic literature on this topic is reviewed along with studies of conflicts 
between mining companies and local communities and studies of livelihood of artisanal 
miners. This review finds that the legislation in Tanzania to be of great importance to the 
conflict, as it gives preferential treatment to foreign large-scale mining companies, while 
dispossessing artisanal miners of their livelihood. The most utilised theoretical approaches in 
the relevant literature are Corporate Social Responsibility and Resource Conflict Theory but 
both fail to acknowledge the human agency aspect by which conflict is relational and 
depending on the actors' perceptions of the circumstances of the conflict. Accordingly this 
thesis turns to the concepts of contestation, protest, and claim-making from Social Movement 
Theory. Within this theoretical framework violence can be an expression of protest, entailing 
feelings of wrong-doing that call for redress. These feelings are socially constructed under 
perceived circumstances, legitimising the feelings, thus ultimately legitimising the way of 
articulating the claims as well. The aim of the study therefore, is to analyse how the 
stakeholders each legitimise their claims. 
Acknowledging the perceptions of the stakeholders as being subjective this study takes on a 
constructionist position. The historical origins and development of the conflict are reviewed 
and the legal context of the conflict is discussed in relation to how it affects the claims of the 
stakeholders. The analysis relies on secondary analysis of qualitative interview data to 
combine the resources of various fieldwork.  
This study finds that the three stakeholders legitimise their claims of access to the gold on 
legal and non-legal grounds different from each other. The perceived legitimacy of the claims 
ultimately justifies violence as a mean to gain or secure the access to the cold, making the 
conflict a manifestation of a clash of articulated claims.
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1.  Introduction: Mining and conflicts  
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM1) is an important livelihood strategy in many 
developing countries2. It is a labour-intensive, low-skilled, manual form of mining with 
minimal mechanisation, using basic tools such as shovels and buckets and is often carried 
out informally. ASM requires limited capital investments to enter and provides employment 
and income to a large number of people in developing countries (Bryceson & Jønsson 
2012: 1; Fisher et al. 2009: 32; Hentschel et al. 2002: 3-4).  
Contrary to ASM, modern large-scale mining (LSM) is high-tech, highly mechanised, 
capital-intensive, employing small but highly skilled work forces (Greenen 2011: 150; IIED 
2002: 201). To attract foreign direct investment (FDI) several mineral rich, Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries have liberalised and restructured their mining sectors throughout 
the 1990s, which have led to a substantial increase of exploration and mining operations by 
foreign LSM companies in these countries. This has been considered an important 
development strategy, strongly encouraged and financially supported by the World Bank 
(WB). The reforms offer investors an attractive business and investment climate in the 
mining sector, with low royalty rates, tax exemptions and transferability of profits, low 
taxes on imports of mining equipment, the ability to carry forward losses and offset these 
against tax, and other incentives to induce growth in the sector (Bebbington et al. 2008: 
889; Carstens & Hilson 2009: 304-305; Curtis & Lissu 2008; WB 1992: xii-xiii). 
The increase in LSM operations has brought them into conflict with existing ASM activities 
and a lot of people have been displaced to accommodate LSM operations (Carstens & 
Hilson 2009: 310; Fisher 2007: 744; Lange 2008: 28; IIED 2002: xviii, 324). SSA has 
experienced the most violent and prolonged conflicts between LSM and ASM3, which in 
many cases have resulted in injuries and casualties and caused costly damage to equipment 
and buildings (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 306, 308). 
1 Although a few distinguish between artisanal and small-scale mining in that they are commonly described 
under this  common abbreviation (e.g. Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 21). This thesis will use the same 
abbreviation and only distinguish between them when necessary, in which case the difference will be 
described explicitly.
2 An estimated 13 million people in about 30 countries are directly engaged in ASM and a further 80 to 100 
million people across the developing world depend on small-scale mining for some aspects of their 
livelihoods (Hentschel et al. 2003: vii).
3 Examples are for instance numerous conflicts  in the Manica Province of Mozambique, during the 1990s, 
conflict in Katanga, Democratic Republic of Congo and violent confrontations in Ghana (Aubynn 2009: 
64; Carstens & Hilson 2009: 308; Dreschler 2001: 52-53).
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In mineral rich4 Tanzania5 , ASM has been carried out in the country since colonial days and 
has proliferated over the past 30 years. An estimated 680.0006 men, women and children are 
currently engaged in ASM making it an important economic activity in Tanzania (Bryceson & 
Jønsson 2012: 1; Jønsson & Fold 2009: 212). At the same time the influx of LSM companies 
have made Tanzania the 3rd largest gold producing country in SSA (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 
309; Hall 2010: 1; THRR 2010: 223). Many people engaged in ASM have been displaced 
from their areas and deprived of mining possibilities as a result of this influx and many now 
work illegally on concessions awarded to mining companies (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 310; 
Hall 2010: 1; Lange 2008: 14).
1.1.  Problem area: The North Mara case
Tanzania is host to one of the most severe cases of ASM-LSM conflict in the world. The 
conflict takes place around the North Mara Gold mine (NMGM) in the north-western part of 
Tanzania, in the Tarime District of the Mara Region7 (see Fig 1 and Fig 2). This case will be 
the focus of this thesis. 
Fig 1. Location of  North Mara         Fig 2. Air photo of the NMGM 
(tanzaniagold.com)       (davidchancellor.com)
The NMGM is owned and operated by African Barrick Gold (ABG), the biggest mining 
4 Tanzania has huge reserves in eleven key minerals which include gold, Nickel, Tanzanite, Diamonds, copper, 
Iron ore, coal, Limestone, soda ash, gypsum and phosphate. The five key minerals and their provable amounts 
in brackets is Gold (2,222tones), Nickel (209million tones), Diamonds (Carat 50.9million), Copper 
(13.65million tones), and Iron ore (103million tones). (tanserve.co.tz). Tanzania is believed to have the 
second largest gold reserves in Africa (mbendi.com). 
5 United Republic of Tanzania (URT)
6 Though some estimates are as high as 1.5 million people but there are no accurate figures available on the 
number of people employed in ASM in Tanzania, especially due to their high mobility and the informal nature 
of their work (Bryceson & Jønsson 2010: 358; Carstens & Hilson 2009: 310 - footnote 3; Jønsson & Fold 
2009: 212 - footnote 2). 
7 100 kilometres east of Lake Victoria and 20 kilometres south of the Kenyan border. 
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company in Tanzania8 and a subsidiary of the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold Corp 
(Barrick), the leading mining company in the world (Barrick.com). The mine is located in the 
middle of seven densely populated villages - Kewanja, Nyakunguru, Kerende, Nyangoto, 
Genkuru, Matongo, Nyamwaga - with a total population of 70,000-122,0009 (Mlowe & 
Olengurumwa 2011: 3; Mwikwabe 2011: 14; York 2011b). The mine consists of two areas. 
One contains the Nyabirama pit and a gold processing plant in the village of Nyangoto (A2 in 
Fig 3). Located seven kilometres north east of this are the Gokona and Nyabigena pits in the 
village of Kewanja (A1 in Fig 3). The two areas cover 41,8km2 in total10 (ABG.com; ABG 
2012e; ICMM 2007: 23). 
Fig 3. The two mine areas (googlemaps)
Prior to the opening of the NMGM in 2002, gold mining activities in North Mara were 
undertaken by local villagers and was their main source of income. The five villages of 
Kerende, Kewanja, Nyamwaga, Genkuru and Nyangoto held mining rights to the areas 
Nyabigena and Nyabirama although many people worked informally. The investment in LSM 
in the area has meant that 40.000 people have been displaced and dispossessed of mining 
opportunities and farm land, as the LSM company acquired mining rights to the areas 
Nyabigena and Nyabirama, excluding the claims of the villages (Bryceson & Jønsson 2012: 1; 
Hall 2010: 3; LEAT 2003a; Mlowe & Olengurumwa: 2011: 4; Mwikwabe 2011: ix, 8, 64). 
The local communities have not benefited from the NMGM and are among the poorest and 
8 ABG also operates the mining sites of Bulyanhulu, Tulawaka and Buzwagi which together with the NMGM 
comprises four of the six largest gold mining sites in Tanzania (ABG.com; Hall 2010: 2). 
9 Estimates differ and the number can vary due to uncertain exact villager borders and in-migration from other 
areas (Mwikwabe 2011: 4). 
10 All three are open pits and conventional hard rock operations with drills. The mining concessions have been 
enlarged several times (ABG 2012e). The Nyabirama pit and plant are now covering 10.5 km2 (6,65 km2 
originally) and the Gokona and Nyabigena pits are now covering 31.3 km2 (8.3 km2 originally). 
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most underdeveloped in Tanzania. Most villages have no utilities such as sewerage or 
electricity and generally there is a low living standard11 (ICMM 2007: 26; Mlowe & 
Olengurumwa: 2011: 4; Mwikwabe 2011: 21; Simpson 2010). Instead they are negatively 
affected by environmental pollution, lack of social services, forced evictions, human rights 
violations, unnecessary arrests, compensation disputes, arguments over economic benefits and 
allegations of sexual assault by police and security guards at the mine (THRR 2010: 225; York 
2011b). 
An estimated 200-300 artisanal miners in groups of three to five people, trespass onto the 
ABG mining concession on a daily basis (see Fig 4 and Fig 5), to scope for gold sand or use 
shovels to dig out low-grade ore from waste rocks (Bariyo & Steward 2009; Cooksey & 
Kelsall 2011: 67; Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 9 ). 
Fig 4. People within the ABG concession    Fig 5. Artisanal miner searching for gold in 
rocks
(davidchancellor.com)    (Bloomberg 2010)
These illegal activities within the ABG mining concessions lead to confrontations with police 
forces stationed in the areas and ABG security guards (Hall 2010: 5; York 2011b). Since the 
NMGM opened at least 50 villagers have been killed in these confrontations and several 
critically injured, making it one of the most violent case of present LSM-ASM conflicts in the 
world (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 2, 17, 21). 
11 Based upon personal observations. In official figures the Mara region has a high poverty rate and the highest 
inequality in Tanzania (Mkenda 2004: 16; NBS 2002: 19; NBS 2011: 4; URT 2005: 111). Regional per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices: 642,528 million Tanzanian Shillings (TShs) (≈ 396.99 
million USD) (NBS 2011: 41). Although the region is not the poorest in all of Tanzania poverty is still 
considerably with 31,9% of the population being below the basic-needs-poverty line in the Tarime district and 
below the average Tanzanian annual income (NBS 2011: 41; URT 2005: 111). 
4
But why is this conflict that violent? Police and security guards have been accused of human 
rights abuses and police brutality, and a shoot-first-ask-later mentality against anyone 
trespassing onto the mining site (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 15-21; Saunders 2011; York 
2011b). The police is ultimately deployed by the government and the government has 
formulated the legal framework regulating the mining sector, which has attracted the foreign 
LSM companies in the fist place. The Tanzanian government is hereby an important 
stakeholder in this case as well. But why is violence utilised and how is it legitimised? That is 
the overall objective for this thesis to investigate as formulated in the research question below. 
1.2.  Research question
Why is the ASM-LSM conflict in North Mara particularly violent and how is this violence 
perceived and legitimised by the stakeholders?
1.2.1.  Sub-questions
To approach this research question, three sub-questions have been formulated. The combined 
answers of these will provide the overall answer to the research question as presented in the 
conclusion of this thesis. As will be argued later on, the sub-questions are derived from, 
theoretical considerations and discussions of concepts of social movements and collective 
struggles, and how these can be applied to an African context, making the theoretical 
framework of this thesis guiding for the thesis and its methodological approaches. In this 
theoretical perspective, protest actions and claim-making of the stakeholders are central to 
explain the the conflict. The perspective regards that claims and protest actions to articulate 
such claims are legitimised  in relation to how the claimants perceive the circumstances under 
which, protests and claims are articulated. 
All three stakeholders; government, company, and artisanal miners have needs and interests in 
gold (Hall 2010: 1). This study regards the claims of access to gold as central to each of the 
stakeholders, focusing the study at these claims.  
The entry of the LSM company in North Mara have changed who access the gold and how 
this is carried out and therefore also changed how this access is being claimed and legitimised. 
This relates to the social circumstances and how these are perceived by each stakeholder and 
how these perceptions have been constructed in relation to the social changes in the area and 
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in the country. The sub-questions therefore are:
• How was and how is the gold accessed and claimed by the stakeholders?
• How are the claims legitimised and how has this legitimacy changed? 
• How is this legitimacy socially constructed?
1.3.  The conflict as a development issue
This thesis regards the conflict in North Mara, Tanzania within the wider context of 
development problems. The communities around the NMGM are rural and poor, whilst the 
price of gold has been rising for decades (ARM 2011: 3; goldprice.org12). ASM is perceived to 
be poverty-driven, but also having development potential in terms of poverty reduction. It is 
far  larger in labour absorption compared to LSM (Bryceson & Jønsson 2012: 1; Fisher et al. 
2009: 36; Hentschel et al. 2003: 1; Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 8). LSM can potentially contribute 
to development at both the national, as well as the local level in terms of increased state 
revenue, employment, local developments initiatives and investments, and positive influence 
on others parts of the industrial sector (Ansoms & Marysse 2011: xvii-xviii; Curtis & Lissu 
2008: 41-43). This positive relationship have however, been strongly contested in the light of 
many examples of failure of LSM to contribute (enough) to development in developing 
countries. This failure has mostly been assigned to improper policies by the governments as 
well as the companies (Bebbington et al. 2008; Curtis & Lissu 2008; Hilson & Haselip 2004; 
Jenkins & Yakovleva 2006; Lange 2006; Lange 2008). 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the academic literature on the complex relationship 
between mining and development in developing countries, especially within the little but 
growing literature on ASM-LSM conflicts. It is the hope of this author that insights into the 
ASM-LSM conflict in North Mara can contribute to a better understanding of the complex 
relationship between conflict and claims and different perceptions of legitimacy. The study 
will challenge existing explanations to conflict and violence in mining areas such as: 
misconceptions between the stakeholders of their alleged rights; confused legal rights; claims 
to the same gold deposits; and a legal framework giving preferential treatment to foreign 
mining companies while marginalising artisanal miners, arguing that these are not incorrect 
but incomplete. Instead I argue that the stakeholders legitimise claims to access the same gold 
resources differently, each in ways that ultimately justifies use of violence to access the gold. 
12 This source offers a historical as well as currently overview of the development of the value of gold. 
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This thesis is biased towards the artisanal miners in North Mara and their situation although, it 
cannot be ignored that ASM is not unproblematic. ASM is often characterised by poor 
working conditions, health hazards, lack of social security, prostitution, child labour, erosion 
and reduced soil fertility, mercury pollution of water sources13, and lack of knowledge about 
the negative consequences of the activities (Bryceson & Jønsson 2012: 2; Hentschel et al. 
2003: vii-viii; Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 55; Schueler et al. 2011: 534). 
It is argued that ASM and LSM target different deposits, as LSM is most suitably for large 
areas and large quantities and can dig much deeper than ASM, whereas ASM targets deposits 
which are uneconomical to extract for LSM companies14. Hence, mineral reserves could be 
exploited to the fullest through cooperation, which could also mitigate many of the problems 
associated with ASM15 (Aubynn 2009: 69; Carsten & Hilson 2009: 306; Dreschler 2001: 21; 
Hilson 2002b: 7). Having this in mind, the conflict in North Mara is a serous barrier to local 
development in the area,  making it all the more relevant to understand the conflict.  
13 Use of mercury is common in North Mara  (Bariyo & Stewart 2009; York 2011b). 
14 Marginal mineral deposits are better suited for ASM operations as they are financially viably because they 
require less time to develop and therefore have a faster payback on investment compared to LSM operations 
(Hilson 2002b: 7).
15 The study by Aubynn describes experiences from Ghana, in which the company Abosso Goldfields Limited 
have implemented a strategy (called “Live and Let Live’’) to lead artisanal miners work within its concession, 
creating a peaceful relationship between the two (Aubynn 2009: 67). 
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2.  Background
This chapter will elaborate on the situation in the area and the characteristics of the local 
communities as well as the ABG to draw up the empirical field to provide an understanding of 
the context of the conflict. 
2.1.  Characteristics of the Local communities 
In this thesis the villagers, artisanal miners and former artisanal miners of the seven villages of 
Kewanja  Nyakunguru, Kerende, Nyangoto, Genkuru, Matongo, Nyamwaga are regarded as 
the local communities around the NMGM (see Fig 6), in line with other research on the 
conflict in North Mara16 (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 3; Hall 2010: 5). 
Fig 6. The villages around the mine (ABG 2010: 5) 
The NMGM is situated in close proximity to many homes, having large piles of waste rock 
almost in their backyard (see Fig 7 and Fig 8) and not everywhere is the line between village 
land and mining area clearly defined (LEAT 2003b; Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 5, 6, 15; 
York 2011b).
16 It should be noted that the area which Barrick/ABG has defined as its neighbourhood, contains thirteen 
villages which besides the seven mentioned includes, Keisangora and Kimusi, Gibaso, Mrito, Nyarwana and 
Weigita (ICMM 2007: 25-26). 
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Fig 7. House next to the mine            Fig 8. Houses next to the mine  
(protestbarrick.net)            (Curtis & Lissu 2008: 8)
2.1.1.  Artisanal and small-scale mining activities 
The main economic activities in Tarime are agriculture, pastoralism and mining but the local 
communities around the mine however, have relied on ASM for approximately 50 years (Hall 
2010: 4; Mlowe & Olengurumwa: 2011: 2, 4, 21; Mwikwabe 2011: 8). Most artisanal miners 
in North Mara have worked or are working informally. The informal ASM sector have little 
regulation and it is difficult to obtain accurate information about it. The informal ASM sector 
is generally isolated from government policy and actions from development planning and 
from wider social and environmental policies, such as health care and natural resource 
management, and ASM is often unsafe, unhealthy and environmentally unsound (Dreschler 
2001: 7; 21; Hentschel et al. 2003: 8-9; Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 9). ASM gold production in the 
Mara region prior to the NMGM was very small17 compared to the volumes that the ABG 
operation amounts to presently. Now ASM activities are conducted around and within the 
NMGM perimeters (Mwikwabe 2011: 43-44; York 2011b). Rocks containing ore are moved to 
the surrounding villages where they are crushed and washed using large amounts of mercury18 
in a basin to extract and separate the gold dust (see Fig 9 and Fig 10).
  
17 Even when considering that existing numbers are probably lower than the actual ASM production, due to the 
informality (ICMM 2007: 40).
18 Which is a hazard to both the artisanal miners and everyone else as I can the local water sources and 
eventually the food chain (Bryceson & Jønsson 2012: 2; Greenen 2011: 164).
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Fig 9. Artisanal miners crushing rocks       Fig 10. Artisanal miners washing out ore
(davidchancellor.com)       (davidchancellor.com)
Once extracted, the gold obtained by the artisanal miners is sold to traders around Lake 
Victoria and ultimately shipped legally or illegally to overseas markets, primarily in Asia 
(Bariyo & Stewart 2009; Fisher et al. 2009: 36; Greenen 2011: 204; Jønsson & Fold 2009: 
215). 
2.2.  NMGM characteristics 
2.2.1.  Performance and NMGM profile 
Gold production of the mine in 2011 amounted to 170,832Oz19/20 (production in 2010: 212,947 
Oz) which is 25% of the overall output of the ABG mines in Tanzania. Revenue in 2011 was 
$1,218 million with a net profit of $275 million. The life expectancy of the NMGM is about 
10 years, based on proven gold reserves of 3,485,000 Oz (ABG.com; ABG 2012a). The mine 
employs 2,329 people, consisting of 1,029 group employees and 1,300 contracted personnel. 
About 700 of these are Tanzanians but only very few are locals (ABG.com; Mwikwabe 2011: 
41; York 2011b). ABG pays 3% of their revenues in royalties to the Tanzanian government 
and corporate taxes have now been disclosed21 (ABG 2012d; Barrick.com). 
19 Oz = ounce. 1 Oz = 28,350g.
20 Up till now the NMGM has produced over 2 million Oz = approximately 56,7 ton of gold.
21 ABG taxes and royalty payments in 2011 (for all four mines). Taxes: $54,242,020. Royalties: $45,642,646 
(including royalties paid to third parties). In 2012, ABG agreed to pay a voluntary additional 1% royalty 
going forward, in addition to the 3% rate stipulated in their MDA In 2011 ABG made a direct contribution to 
Tanzania of $176 million in taxes borne (ABG 2012d; Barrick.com). 
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2.2.2.  African Barrick Gold acquisition of the NMGM
The ownership of the NMGM has come in the hands of ABG via a few detours. The 
Tanzanian company Afrika Mashariki Gold Mines Ltd. (AMGM), a 100% owned subsidiary 
of the Australian based East Africa Gold Mines Ltd. (EAGM), was originally granted the 
mining licenses to the areas in 1996 by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) and 
opened the NMGM (then Afrika Mashariki Mine) in November 2002 (LEAT 2003b). In 2003 
AMGM/EAGM was by bought by the Vancouver based Placer Dome, which hereby acquired 
the mine. In 2006, Barrick acquired control of Placer Dome and hereby ownership of the 
NMGM (Barrick 3 2012; LEAT 2003a).
In 2010, Barrick established African Barrick Gold22 to operate and manage the gold mines in 
Tanzania (Barrick.com). Some claim that this was done to distance itself from the problems 
around the mine, which had attracted negative attention towards Barrick ever since it acquired 
the mine in 2006 (York 2011b). The original agreement by which AMGM/EAGM acquired the 
the village land (see chapter 6) contained provision of compensation and obligations for the 
company to invest in the local communities23. ABG have inherited these terms but they have 
never been complied with by any of the companies24. Since 2010 however, a range of 
community development programmes have been initiated and in 2012, ABG signed Village 
Benefit Agreements (VBAs) with all seven villages. This includes compensation payments of 
$100,000 to each of the seven villages in an attempt to end the longstanding issues25 and a 
$8.5millions investment26 in the seven communities,  along with local and national initiative 
not confined to the communities around the NMGM (ABG 2012b; Kisanga 2012; The Citizen 
2011a). 
2.3.  Major incidents of violence  
The daily confrontations between artisanal miners, and security guards and police forces have 
sometimes escalated and people have been killed. A couple of these escalated incidents have 
attracted considerable attention from the media, NGOs and activist groups. The specific 
22 ABG is a company listed on the London Stock Exchange that owns gold mines and exploration properties in 
Africa. Barrick holds a 73.9% equity interest in ABG.
23 Rates of 150,000 TShs (≈ 92.5 USD) per one square feet to any person who was deprived of land and 
obligations for the company to give 25% of its earnings to education services:, building a development 
college; and a college for the development of women (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011:5).
24 ABG contributes with 1% of its earnings to community development programmes (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 
2011: 52)
25 ABG formulation. 
26 Which includes the development of school infrastructure, provision of clean water, the upgrading of a local 
health centre to a hospital level where it will receive national funding, rehabilitation of village offices, 
improvements to the road infrastructure and extension of overhead electricity lines (ABG 2012b). 
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circumstances of these incidents however, are uncertain and reports differs on numbers, 
whether the miners had weapons or did not or were peaceful or attacking the company 
security guards. 
In December 2008, a number of people, armed with bows, arrows and pangas, invaded one pit 
after it had been blasted for ore and burned $727 million worth of equipment. Field Force Unit 
(FFU) troops were brought in to disperse the invaders and they shot and killed one trespasser 
(Cooksey & Kelsall 2011: 67; Simpson 2010). The most noticed incidents among media and 
human rights organisation is the incident of May 16th 2011, in which five people were shot and 
killed and more than 10 people were left injured by police officers. An estimated 800-1500 
people entered the mining site for the sake of collecting the gold from the waste rock, due to 
inside information that the waste rock on this day would include high-quality rocks (ABG 
2011a; Guardian 2011; Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 9; Saunders 2011). In November 2012 
more than armed 4,000 people raided the NMGM, prompting policemen on patrol to use their 
firearms to disperse them, killing one person in the process (Guardian 2012). 
No one have been arrested for these killings (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 17-21).
27  Originally estimated at upwards of $16 million.
12
3.  Review of existing literature 
This chapter will discuss existing, relevant literature on ASM-LSM conflicts and related 
issues, discussing the explanations to ASM-LSM conflicts that this literature offers. This will, 
based on a critical review of the theoretical approaches of this literature, lead to the chosen 
theoretical approach of this study. The utilised methods in this literature will also serve as 
inspiration to the methodological approach of this study.
3.1.  Studies of conflicts between artisanal and large-scale mining 
Existing academic literature on the situation in the North Mara case is limited28 but it has 
attracted significant attention from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), activist groups, 
and news media (local and international)29. Academically the case is mostly discussed 
peripherally30 within the broader discussion of problematic issues related to LSM or ABG 
operations in Tanzania. It is therefore more relevant to consult literature specifically on ASM-
LSM conflicts. There are few studies of ASM-LSM conflicts and ASM-LSM relationships in 
Tanzania but the amount of literature is growing. Carstens & Hilson (2009), Lange (2008) and 
Lugoe (2011) are important case-studies on this topic. Focusing on the gold-rich Geita District 
in Northern Tanzania (approximately 200 km south west of North Mara) Carstens & Hilson, 
along with other authors have found that conflicts between ASM and LSM in Tanzania are 
attributable to a policy environment which gives preferential treatment to LSM companies at 
the expense of the ASM sector (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 310, 320; Jønsson & Fold 2009: 218; 
Lange 2011: 4). Lange and Lugoe focus on the mineral policies in Tanzania. Lange finds that 
the legal framework is ambiguous, leading to contradicting and conflicting claims of access to 
resources between artisanal miners and LSM companies (Lange 2008: 20-21). Both Lange and 
Lugoe find that the legislation offers poor security of land tenure for communities resulting in 
forced relocation and inadequate compensation (Lange 2008: 20-21; Lugoe 2011: 34).  
Along with literature on ASM-LSM conflicts in Tanzania, there is a fair amount of literature 
on this problem in other countries. Aubynn (2009), based on experience from Ghana, regards 
ASM-LSM conflicts as: “... contestation to exploit the same mineral resources in territories  
where the competing operators have divergent views of land ownership.“ (Aubynn 2009: 65). 
The author argues that mining companies and artisanal miners have different claims to the 
28 I have been able to find two studies plus a couple more dealing with the case peripherally. 
29 E.g. Corpwach (2007), Mlowe & Olengurumwa (2011), Saunders (2011), York (2011b). 
30 See Bebbington et al. 2008; Curtis & Lissu 2008; Goldstuck & Hughes 2010; SID 2009.
13
same resources, the companies at the basis of legally acquired concessions and the artisanal 
miners on their traditional rights to work on the land (Aubynn 2009: 65). 
These studies put much emphasis on the legal framework of mining and land. Further review 
of the practical implications of this legislation in regard to the ASM-LSM conflict in North 
Mara is therefore necessary for this thesis.
3.2.  Studies of artisanal mining livelihood
The two most cited references in studies of ASM are Dreschler (2001) and Hentschel et al. 
(2002). The latter studies ASM in countries around the world whereas the first concentrates on 
SSA countries. ASM-LSM conflicts have also been discussed as part of general studies of 
ASM in Tanzania, again arguing that relocation and inadequate compensation arise a source of 
conflict (Bryceson & Jønsson 2012: 2) and that, much in line with Carstens & Hilson (2009), 
officials anxious to encourage FDI and support the development of the LSM industry, 
marginalise artisanal miners in the decision making process (Fisher 2007: 754). Additionally 
there is a large body of literature on Tanzanian ASM livelihood31 and its contribution to 
development (e.g. Fisher et al. 2009; Jønsson & Fold 2009; Mwaipopo et al. 2004). 
These type of studies serve as valuable introduction to the ASM sector but are unspecific 
regarding ASM-LSM conflicts. Both type of studies overall utilise qualitative, methodological 
approaches conducting fieldwork and interviewing stakeholders and key informants in the 
selected areas. Some combine this with a few statistics on the financial output of ASM and 
LSM respectively, or with a global, political economy perspective, discussing how the reforms 
to attract FDI have put control of natural resource in the hands of foreign companies, 
weakened the power of host-governments to manage these resources for the purpose of 
national development (Auty 2006: 137; Hilson & Haselip 2004: 28; Jensen 2009: 7-8). 
Likewise both type of studies share an emphasis on the legal framework when it comes to 
ASM-LSM conflicts. However, I will argue that they disregard the human agency perspective; 
the actions and choices of the actors involved in the conflict and that they cannot account for 
the violent aspect of the conflict. Many are theoretically vague and very inductive in their 
approaches but some apply the theoretical concepts of Resource Conflicts Theory (see 
Bebbington et al. 2008; Carstens & Hilson 2009; Franks 2009). 
31 Besides just as much focusing on ASM in Ghana (e.g. Aubynn 2009; Banchirigah 2008, Garvin et al. 2009) or 
the African continent in general (e.g. Dreschler 2001; Hilson 2002b; Hilson 2009). 
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3.3.  Studies of Mine-Community conflicts
ASM-LSM conflicts can be analysed within the broader issue of Mine-Community conflicts 
which is a relatively familiar feature of the global mining industry (Franks 2009: 2). One way 
is to consider the wide range of social, environmental and economic impacts, LSM operations 
have been proven to have on local communities especially in developing countries. Among 
many issues, this includes pollution from the mining operation, marginalisation of different 
groups (particularly women), human rights abuses by mining personnel, re-location of people, 
and demands of employment and local investments32 (see Bebbington & Williams 2008; 
Franks 2009; Kemp et al. 2011; Schueler et al. 2011). The assumption in these studies is that 
conflicts are caused by such impacts.  A slightly different assumption is that conflicts are a 
result of (perceived) unequal distribution of cost and benefits (negative and positive impacts) 
between stakeholders, where the company harvest the benefits, while the communities 
experience the costs (Bebbington et al. 2008: 888; Kemp et al. 2011: 93; Muradian et al. 2003: 
775-776). In other words, conflicts in this perspective are not caused by the negative impacts 
alone, but by a feeling among the local communities that they do not benefit enough compared 
to the company. 
These studies provide insights into the broad range of issues that local communities can 
encounter when LSM companies enters, and how these can lead to conflict. However, this 
approach does not consider specifically the very direct impact that LSM operations have on 
ASM-livelihood and the ever ongoing struggle between the two stakeholders, over the same 
resources. This is not to say that negative impacts from the NMGM at the local communities 
have nothing to do with the conflict. Instead, I argue that these studies cannot distinguish the 
particularities of the ASM-LSM conflict from the broader perspective of Mine-Community 
conflicts. 
3.3.1.  Applied theories of this literature 
Two of the most utilised theoretical approaches in research on Mine-Community conflicts 
have been Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Resource Conflict Theory. Both rely on 
further assumptions about the causes of conflict in relation to LSM operations.  
32 See Franks (2009: 3) for a neat overview.
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3.3.1.1.  Corporate Social Responsibility 
The CSR perspective considers CSR-policies33 for proper corporate practice that is social 
responsible and sustainable, beyond legal requirements (Yankson 2010: 358). Authors utilising 
this approach their studies of Mine-Community conflicts include Anguelovski (2011), 
Goldstuck & Hughes (2010), Szablowski (2002), and Yankson (2010). The interaction with 
local communities in which they operate is an important aspect. For the mining sector the 
CSR-approach relies on a notion that companies need a social license to operate by the local 
communities. The social license is conditional on companies behaving in a manner that is 
consultative, collaborative, ethical, progressive and legitimate, to build greater trust and to win 
community support necessary to minimise disruption in their operations and not to bring them 
into conflict with the communities (Anguelovski 2011: 386; Goldstuck & Hughes 2010: 6; 
Lange 2006: 42). As conflict can be of great cost to a company (e.g. financing, construction, 
operations, reputation), Companies take great interest in avoiding or mitigating conflict (Davis 
& Franks 2011: 2). Conflicts are often attributed to simple lack of knowledge and 
misunderstandings of facts concerning the mining operation in the communities (Frank 2009: 
8; Kemp et al. 2011: 105; IIED 2002: 358; Newenham-Kahindi 2011: 270). 
This literature often seem to be biased in favour of the company not asking whether an 
operation should exist in the first place, and it is generally confident that operations proper 
CSR-policies and behaviour accordingly will minimise conflict with local communities. 
In this literature the causes of conflict are also being assigned to corruption and lack of 
accountability on behalf of the government (Newenham-Kahindi 2011: 270). In this view 
corporations simply act according to governments requirements and blame for wrongful 
doings, which lead the operation into conflict with local communities should therefore be 
directed at the host-governments. This explanation is not too far from previously discussed 
explanations, emphasising the legal framework as a source of conflict. However this view 
does not recognise that companies do benefit from dealing with governments they know to be 
weak or corrupt, hereby increasing the risk of their operating coming into conflict with the 
local communities (Goldstuck & Hughes 2010: 6; Kemp et al. 2011: 93; IIED 2002: xix).    
33 Besides companies' own CRS policies there are global CSR guidelines that companies can voluntary adhere 
to: e.g. United Nations Global Compact; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; 
Amnesty International's Human Rights Guidelines for Companies. 
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3.3.1.2.  Resource Conflict Theory 
This literature offers another way to conceptualise Mine-Community conflicts particularly in 
developing countries. Inspired by the resource curse thesis34 (see Auty 2001; Karl 1999; Sachs 
& Warner 1995, 1997; Ross 1999, 2001) the theory discusses the relationship between natural 
resources and civil violence (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004, 2005, De Soysa & Neumayer, 
2007). The relationship is explained through two concepts:
• Greed: The idea that civil wars unfold in resource-rich regions because of rebel groups’ 
predatory motivations or desires to ‘get rich quick’. The resources can provide the 
rebel-groups with finance for large-scale violence.
• Grievance: Motivation based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is 
treated.
(Collier & Hoeffler 2004: 564, 2005: 626; Collier et al. 2008: 464; De Soysa & Neumayer, 
2007: 203).  
Since the concept of greed is aimed at large-scale violence and civil war the concept of 
grievance is the most interesting. The studies of Mine-Community conflicts utilise this 
concept by regarding the impacts of LSM as causing grievance among groups of the 
community. Violence in this case is a manifestations of community agitation over these 
impacts (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 302). Hence, a sense of injustice is linked to the negative 
impacts as causes of conflict. The grievance-term has become common within the mining 
sector (see IIED 2002) and even ABG uses this term to describe the causes of the conflict 
(ABG 2011b; The Citizen 2012). The grievance concept is interesting but vague on how a 
sense of injustice leads to violence.
34 Based on work by Sachs & Warner (1995/1997) who found a negative relationship between the abundance of 
natural resources in developing countries and their economic growth, compared to countries without this 
abundance (Sachs & Warner 1997: 2, 26). Explanations to this have been attributed to economic (Dutch 
Disease) and political (poor governance or weakened institutions) effects:
• Dutch Disease: Boom in natural resource exports draws labour and capital away from other sectors of 
the economy (de-industrialization) leading to real exchange rate appreciation, decreasing the 
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector, and increasing imports while decreasing exports (Ross 
2001: 10-11; Sachs & Warner 1997: 5).    
• Political effects: The easy rents achieved from the natural resources leads government towards 
corruption, increased military spending and inefficient institutions and takes away incentives for 
governments to invest in their economy and for efficient policy making (Karl 1999: 36, 43; Ross 2001: 
4; Sachs & Warner 1997: 9). Interestingly it is the latter explanation that mining companies rely on 
when they blame the host-government for their conflict with local communities. 
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3.3.2.  Critique of the theoretical approaches 
Both CSR and Resource Conflict Theory concepts fail to acknowledge that conflict is: 
• relational and interactional (Özen & Özen 2011: 346; Kemp et al. 2011: 94 ) 
◦ between the stakeholders of the state, the community and the capital (company), 
which are the three major ‘players’ in the resource extraction sector (Banks 2008: 
24). Hereby conflict evolves through interaction rather than through external 
circumstances.  
• not objective but based on the stakeholder's perceptions of what are the causes of 
conflict (Anguelovski 2011: 385; Garvin et al. 2009: 574; Muradian et al. 2003: 775-
776). Especially the study by Garvin et al. (2009) is important in this respect, as it 
discovers how difference in perceptions between the stakeholders is a cause of 
conflict, whereas especially the literature on Mine-Community conflict seems to 
regard the causes as separated from the actors. 
Considering this critique, this study will now turn to Social Movement Theory (SMT) to 
obtain  more adequate explanatory concepts to the ASM-LSM conflict in North Mara. This 
chapter have however, been very inspirational and SMT can elaborate on the argument of the 
greed-concept that feelings are important to explain the violent conflict along with the 
importance of the legislation.
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4.  Theoretical discussion and applied theory  
This chapter will discuss relevant concepts within SMT and the advantages and limitations of 
these concepts in an African context leading to a discussion of the SMT-related concepts 
contestation, protest and claim-making. 
4.1.  Social movements and other related concepts
There is a vast amount of literature dealing with social movements, collective action, political 
participation and mobilisation. This have addressed how different movements have organised 
themselves, mobilised and struggled for political change, as well as analysed what determines 
the outcome of this, which have been applied to protests, civic organisations, nationalism, 
revolutions, state-structures among many other things (see e.g. Tilly 2004a: 473; McAdam et 
al. 2001: 6). 
4.2.  The evolution of Social Movement Theory  
SMT is a theoretical framework developed to describe the empirical phenomenon of social 
movements. There is general consensus among researchers that the historical origin of the 
social movement can be traced back to the 18th century35, during which a new form of political 
participation among people outside the ruling political system developed. This happened as 
the representative democracy at the time was deemed incapable of advancing popular 
sovereignty36, as it left no room for the people to influence the parliament except around the 
time of elections. This lead to sustained mass movement campaigns that stretched over several 
months, involving demonstrations, strikes, petitions, pamphleteering, public meetings, which 
addressed the rulers directly with claims to a fairer distribution of power (Rudbeck 2012: 581-
599; Tilly 2004b: 17-25). In the 19th century people with no access to political power began to 
recognise mobilisation as a mean to urge power-holders to attend to their interests, and many 
countries in Europe and South America experienced democratic transitions followed by 
increased mobilisation and increased international connection among these (Tilly 2004b: 57-
58, 64; Tilly & Castañeda 2007: 34).  The 20th century witnessed increased class-
35 It is important to notice however that different emphasis by different scholars regarding the exact nature of 
social movements have lead to different conclusions about when and where social movements and their new 
repertoire of contention first occurred, and even Tilly, a main-contributor to this chapter, hesitated to describe 
this mobilization as a social movement (Rudbeck 2012: 586).
36 In previous interpretations of sovereignty, it lied with the crown as absolute ruler which thus was above the 
law, and the right to disobey authority was limited to the absolute entitlements of self-presevation (Rudbeck 
2012: 589- 590). 
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consciousness in the postwar period. Students and workers revolted, challenging repressive, 
authoritarian regimes (Tilly 2004b: 68-69, 74-76). Through the beginning of the 21st century 
globalisation has contributed to an internationalisation of movements across country boarders 
(Tilly 2004b: 101). 
4.3.  Conceptual development
At the backdrop of this historical development of new ways of political participation, SMT 
has been developed accordingly to understand and explain these and investigate the 
circumstances under which they succeed or not. This development continuously challenges 
and reformulates the meaning of SMT to accommodate the historical changes in mobilisation 
and political participation, leading to internal division and specialisation such as resource 
mobilisation, political process, protest, framing or new social movement theories, which each 
implies certain choices of focus and approach (Mees 2004: 312; Tilly 2004a: 473).
4.3.1.  Charles Tilly and social movements
A key author in social movement literature is the social scientist Charles Tilly (1929-2008), 
who has been very influential in both the conceptual and analytical development of the study 
of social movements37. Tilly defines social movements as:  
sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise 
that claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain 
these activities. (Tilly & Castañeda 2007: slide 40). 
This can involve different forms of political actions such as: creation of special-purpose 
associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, 
demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering. Social 
movements perform those campaigns of collective claims making through public, collective 
action, which links two complementary activities: assertions of identity and statements of 
demands (Tilly 2004a: 473-474; Tilly 2004b: 3-4; Tilly & Castañeda 2007: slide 34). The 
claims involve a righting of a wrong, most often a wrong suffered by a well-specified 
population. Herein lies the identity, for instance as wronged workers, dispossessed peasants, or 
persecuted religious minorities, which constitutes them collectively with a shared agenda, 
37 His work include the two important an much cited; From Mobilization to Revolution (Tilly 1978) in which he 
examining the ways people act together in pursuit of common interests and  applies various political process 
models for  the analysis of collective action; and Social Movements, 1768–2004 (Tilly 2004b) in which he 
analyses the origins of contemporary social movement practices, relations of social movements to 
democratization, and the  likely futures of social movements.  
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hereby publicly displaying their unity and commitment to the movement and to their claims 
(Tilly 1991: 601; Tilly 1998: 467; Tilly 2004b: 3-4; Tilly & Castañeda 2007: slide 34). This 
definition entails a rather sharp distinction of what entails a social movement and what does 
not. The original definition of social movements by Tilly excludes the use of violence and 
draws a distinction between social movements and other forms of collective contentious action 
such as insurrections, insurgencies, peasant uprisings, rebellions, and revolutions, which 
usually involve widespread violence (Rudbeck 2012: 585-586). Interestingly the first social 
movement in the 18th century were accused of insurrection and rebellion (Rucbeck 2012: 582). 
The analysis of this thesis will demonstrate similar accusations from ABG as well as the 
Tanzanian government toward the artisanal miners, with the purpose of de-legitimising their 
claims. 
4.3.2.  Contentious politics
Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow are two other important contributors to the social 
movement literature and, together with Tilly they have developed the concepts even further 
and included them in their framework of contentious politics (McAdam et al. 2001). 
Contentious politics is: 
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claim and their objects when 
(a) when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the 
claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interest of at leas one of the 
claimants. (McAdam et al. 2001: 5)
Compared to the previous definition of social movements this is more open. It focuses on the 
process, disregarding the features of the movement, hence the sharp distinction between social 
movements and a non-social movements embedded in previous definitions has somewhat 
faded in this definition. It argues for explanation of claim-centered episodes through 
identification of similar mechanisms and processes across a wide variety of political forms, 
having in common their public character and their relations to governments (Tilly 2004a: 
474). Social movements are, by this definition, just one variation of a variety of forms of 
collective claim-making. 
Movements and their claims often give rise to responses – counter claims - by authorities and 
objects of claims or among those whose advantages would be threaten by success of the 
movement's claims (Tilly 1998: 467-470). SMT hereby, acknowledges the relational nature of 
ASM-LSM conflicts which CSR and Resource Conflict Theories, do not adequately. 
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4.4.  Limitations of Social Movement Theory in an African setting
Some authors however, have challenged the applicability of contemporary SMT in an African 
setting (e.g. Brandes & Engels 2011; Larmer 2010; Macamo 2011; Roy 2010).
4.4.1.  Epistemological challenges of Social Movement Theory
Elísio Macamo38 and Miles Larmer39 who both have analysed political struggles in Africa, 
have directed important critique towards SMT, arguing that this theory is based on European 
historical development (as described previously in this chapter) with embedded notions of 
government, democracy, collective organisation, direct action, political parties and civil 
society (Larmer 2010: 257; Macamo 2011: 50). Such notions do not often correspond with the 
empirical realities of the African continent. Most African countries, Tanzania included, have a 
short independent political history compared to western counterparts and have therefore not a 
strong tradition of political participation (Larmer 2010: 257; Macamo 2011: 57; THRR 2010: 
32). Besides, the notion of social movements is too broad to capture local political processes 
as they occur in African political settings, which often takes place at the micro level, which the 
Norht Mara case also does (Macamo 2011: 55 - footnote 5; 65). 
4.4.2.  Formal vs informal organisation 
The definition of social movements presented previously in this chapter have a strong implicit 
notion of formal organization, I argue, with emphasis on “sustained campaigns”, 
“organisations” and “network” and often SMT has been applied to overt institutional and 
organisational forms, like civic organisations, environmental groups, worker unions, church or 
other religious groups (see e.g. Moodie 2002; Tilly 2004a). Moodie (2002) argues that SMT 
more and more only regard formal organisations as having any potential of collective action 
(Moodie 2002: 58). However, according to Larmer, movements in Africa can take on more 
amorphous and temporary forms. NGOs, civil society organisations, self-defined social 
movements, strikes and riots, mobs and crowds, all exhibit elements of a social movement but 
they may recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation (Larmer 2010: 252). On 
this account, Larmer is arguing along the lines of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, who include 
both contained and transgressive (institutionalised and non-institutionalised) actors in their 
framework of contentious politics, acknowledging that the latter can adopt means that are 
either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime (McAdam et al. 2001: 7-8). Working 
38  A political sociologist, with primary focus on Africa.
39  Senior Lecturer in International History specialising in African history.
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informally the miners are not formally organised but when 800-1500 or even 4000 people 
enter a certain area at the same time, as describe in the previous chapter the actions are clearly 
sustained, public and collective, even though the nature of the ASM working process is less 
coherent (Bryceson et al. 2010: 375-376). 
4.5.  Protest and claim-making 
This chapter now turns to elaborate and discuss the process of the collective actions, inspired 
by the framework of contentious politics. Attention is given to collective claim-making, its 
articulations and the contents of claims, which are regarded as contestation which finds 
practical expression in protest (Macamo 2011: 46, 64). Protest is a form of dissent and 
collective claim making, which shows how these concepts have arisen from the framework of 
social movements (Macamo 2011: 45). Key attributes of claim-making in protest are: 
• forms of articulation - can be violent (e.g. looting, clashes with police, road 
obstructions) or peaceful (e.g. marches)
• structure of articulation - can be organised (trade unions, interest groups) or 
spontaneous (e.g. youth, market vendors, dwellers)
• content - can articulate demands (e.g. new measures and policies) or reject impositions 
(e.g. measures and policies)
• target - can be clear (e.g. official in charge, government agency, party) or unclear (e.g. 
general dissatisfaction)
• direction - can point towards change (e.g. resignation of officials, government, new 
elections) or preservation of the status quo (e.g. corrections in favour group interest) 
(Macamo 2011: 58). 
Violence is in this respect a potential feature of articulation of claim-making and the 
“contents” “target” and “direction” represents the contents and the aims of the claims. Protest 
shares some features with SMT and contentious politics and especially the more open-ended 
approach of the latter is reflected in claim-making protest; forms and structure. Uniquely to 
protest however, is that the direction not necessarily involves change as especially SMT 
assume. Protest for the preservation of social, economical or political conditions can be just as 
much a struggle as the opposite.
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4.5.1.  Legitimacy and perceptions
SMT has a strong tendency to package the agendas of social movements into a normative 
frame of reference that lends normative and teleological legitimacy to protest, in which social 
movements are authentic and unproblematic movements of the people, with legitimate 
grievances against the powerful and exploitative forces in society or the dominant political 
order. The concepts of protest and claim-making on the other hand, does not pass judgement 
on the societal relevance of contestation (Larmer 2010: 252; Macamo 2011: 48; 54). Macamo 
argues that the expression of contestation encompasses feelings of outrage and anger as 
particular manifestations of contestation (Macamo 2011: 45, 46, 52). Anger entails a feeling of 
having been wronged or offended and calls, consequently, for some form of redress and 
outrage is simply its intensified form coupled with the idea that normative expectations have 
been violated. Anger and outrage are socially constructed under circumstances in which 
individuals feel strongly unhappy, hereby legitimising this feeling (Macamo 2011: 45, 46). In 
other words, struggle has to resonate with people’s concept of legitimate, meaningful, and 
justifiable political action although not necessarily legal (Rudbeck 2012: 587-588). Conflict as 
a product of contestation has no objective causes as CSR and Resource Conflict Theories 
otherwise argue but are rather tied to individual feelings and perceptions about circumstances 
which have led to wrong-doings (Macamo 2011: 46). 
To sum up contestation is protest and claim-making that: 
• entails a sense of  of wrong-doing that call for redress
• have internally legitimacy to the protesters 
• is socially constructed under perceived circumstances contributing to the legitimacy of 
the actions
This also sums up the inspiration to the sub-questions, especially the last two focusing on 
legitimacy and the construction of this legitimacy. 
4.6.  Protest and claim-making of artisanal miners
The fact that the operations of the artisanal miners entering ABG concessions are illegal 
should not refrain us from considering their struggles but rather examine their actions closer. It 
is beneficial to regard the actions of the artisanal miners as claim-making, manifested through 
collective protest, derived  from their perceived claims. This makes identification of these 
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claims, their contents and how they are legitimised the main focus for the analysis. According 
to Rudbeck people refrain from acting in ways that are meaningless, especially if such actions 
potentially come at high costs (Rudbeck 2012: 587-588). However, the seemingly violent 
form of protest and the high number of causalities in the North Mara case strongly implies 
deep-lying meaning to these claims and an embedded feeling of outrage. The protest action is 
met with opposing claims by ABG and the government resulting in dissent, making the 
conflict an interaction between the three stakeholders. 
The artisanal miners are therefore not the only claimants and the claims of the mining 
company and the government must be a target of the analysis as well. This thesis must 
investigate the features of protest (forms of articulation, structure of articulation, content, 
target, and direction) discusses previously in this chapter and more importantly the 
construction of legitimacy. 
To Larmer, struggles in Africa are related to the context of political, economic and social 
change on the continent (Larmer 2010: 251). In this case the change is of change in access to 
the gold for the the different stakeholders and therefore also a change in their claims to this 
access (or the creation entirely new claims). 
This section has shown how the sub-questions are inspired and derived from the concepts of 
contestation, protest and claim-making, and argued how these are help answer the main 
research question of this thesis. It has also stated why the claims of all three stakeholders have 
to be analysed to understand the conflict. Ultimately the conflict is a result of different 
perceptions of how the each stakeholder relate to the circumstances of the social world, 
affecting their claim to access the gold resources. When this claim is violated it leads to a 
sense of wrong-doing among the stakeholder group which requires redress, for which physical 
protest is legitimate. This approach is considerable different from the theoretical approaches 
discussed in the previous chapter, which seem to regard the causes of conflict as external to 
the actors involved. 
The concepts of contestation, protest and claim-making amounts to a theoretical framework 
which is critical to the choices of methodological approaches, presented and discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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5.  Methodological approach  
The aim of this chapter is to establish and account for how this thesis will answer the sub-
questions to provide an answer to the main research question. Emphasis is put on the 
methodological approach to answer the last two sub-questions as these presents the most 
challenging in terms of data collection and analysis. This chapter will focus on, why 
secondary analysis of qualitative interview has been chosen as the methodological approach to 
data collection. It discusses the ontological and epistemological position of this study and how 
this relates to the theoretical framework. Furthermore, it discusses the disadvantages of the 
chosen methods and what this means to the validity of the finding of this study. The aim of 
this chapter is therefore also to provide internal validity to the thesis, explaining in which 
context the conclusion should be understood. 
5.1.  Ontology and epistemology
The sub-questions focus on the claims of the stakeholders; the artisanal miners, the Tanzanian 
government, and the mining company ABG, to access to the gold in North Mara. As stated in 
the previous chapter, the claims and actions are justified by the perceived wrong-doings under 
circumstances affecting the access to the gold of the individual stakeholders. In other words 
the analysis is interested in examining the social world as seen through the eyes of its 
participants, Therefore this study adopts a constructionist ontological position, in which social 
properties are outcomes of interaction between individuals and their interpretations of the 
social world. 
5.2.  Qualitative research strategy
To look through the eyes of the studied actors this study utilise a qualitative research strategy, 
acknowledging the subjectivity of the research. This is however, not an inductive study where 
the aim is generating of theory (Bryman 2004: 266). Rather this study demonstrate a 
qualitative research design utilising a theoretical framework to guide the analysis, in which 
understanding and not the formulation of theory is the aim. 
This research is also micro-oriented, as the conflict in the local area of North Mara, Tanzania 
and the stakeholders involved there are in focus in of this study. 
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5.3.  Initial steps to the analysis 
The answers to the first sub-question lays the foundation to the analysis of the following two. 
Chapter 2 has already described how efforts to access the gold by the different stakeholders 
have resulted in violence and killings but to account for the change in this access it is 
necessary to with a historical review of the origins of the conflict and a discussion of the legal 
framework in Tanzania and how changes in this have affected the claims of each stakeholder. 
The historical review in the next chapter relies on sources of different research, which have 
incorporated a historical background description. The following chapter discussing the legal 
framework  relies on the official law documents and other authors who already have analysed 
the legal framework. This chapter also responds to arguments from the review literature in 
which the legislations is said to be important to the conflict. These two chapters make up the 
combined answers to the first sub-question, describing the circumstances of changed claims. 
Thus they provide a foundation which will be referred to throughout the analysis, answering 
the next two sub-questions. It is these questions that presents the most challenging as they 
investigate the subjective opinions of the studied stakeholders and the rest of this chapter will 
focus on how these are approached.
5.4.  Data collection: Qualitative interviewing 
Much research in the reviewed literature on ASM livelihood and ASM-LSM conflicts have 
utilised the method of participant observation and different kinds of interviewing styles. 
Qualitative interviewing is regarded as the the most suitably method of data collection for this 
study, in order to get “their stories” of how they perceive their claims to access the gold. This 
is chosen because of the focus on the articulations of claims, rather than observed behaviour. 
For the comparability of data this single method rather than a multi-method approach is 
preferable. This research has not utilised fieldwork or otherwise produced primary data 
through interviews as a method of data-collection. There are a couple of reasons for this. The 
sub-question must be answered in relation to each of the three stakeholders. This influences 
the data-collection which differs for the three stakeholders because access to data from each 
stakeholder is different. Primary interviews are therefore not sufficient as the only sources of 
data and the availability of data, as discussed below, suggest a slightly different method of 
data collection to be the most constructive. 
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5.4.1.  Stakeholder definitions 
A clear definition of the stakeholders is necessary to account for who can articulate claims that 
are representative of each stakeholder group and who exactly are part of this group, which 
influences which sources that must be approached. Additionally this definitions also establish 
the stakeholders as targets of claims (cf. the previous chapter). 
5.4.1.1.  African Barrick Gold/Barrick
As the mine is operated by ABG but is majority-owned by Barrick, representatives of both 
companies are regarded as part of the same stakeholder-group. This includes management or 
other executives, who are able to represent ABG and Barrick in public. ABG mineworkers and 
security guards are involved physically but the claims articulated by ABG do not relate to 
them as individuals. 
5.4.1.2.  The Tanzanian government
The Tanzanian government has developed the legal mining framework and are granting 
mineral rights. Ministers and other state officials are considered to be considered relevant 
representatives of the government. Physically they are involved in the conflict through the 
deployment of police forces in the area around the NMGM. The police however, should not be 
seen as a claimant in their own right but only as acting on behalf of the state. In cases of 
claims targeted at the police, it is the government that must be considered the real target. This 
study does not regard electoral shifts in government as relevant, because the claims of the 
government are strongly related to the mining legislation, as will be argued later on, which is 
not a subject to electoral change.
5.4.1.3.  The artisanal miners 
The artisanal miners are rather difficult to define as a specific stakeholder-group. The local 
communities are depending on the gold but the establishment of the NMGM has meant that a 
lot of people can no longer engage in ASM activities although they still have claims to do so. 
This stakeholder groups, therefore, includes both current and former artisanal. Besides those 
working within the perimeters of ABG, women and children are involved in the extraction 
process. The stakeholder-group can therefore be said to include former and present artisanal 
miners and affiliated workers. This study focuses specifically on the ASM-LSM conflict and 
claim of access to the gold, and relevance of a claim is hereby determined. Hence, claims to be 
allocated benefits from the gold production or of compensation for pollution or other negative 
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impacts of the ABG operation, associated with Mine-Community conflicts are not relevant in 
this study. This is not to say that artisanal miners are not a part of the local communities or 
that they cannot articulate such claims but rather to maintain a specific focus on the ASM-
LSM aspect. Because the distinction can fluctuate at times, careful considerations must be 
made to whether an individual is articulating a claim as a part of this stakeholder. 
Another problem in defining this stakeholder-group is that there has been a considerably 
amount of immigration to the area, both from other parts of Tanzania, artisanal miners who 
left the area and have returned again, as well as immigrants from the neighbouring country 
Kenya, which is bordering not far from the NMGM (Mwikwabe 2011: 4). Again this means 
that close attention must be paid to who the claim- makers are but also that it is impossibly to 
account for any exact size of this stakeholder. 
Some research states that mining and other extractive operations can cause internal division 
and conflict in the local communities deriving from their different perceptions of cost and 
benefits and the impacts on them and the community (Banks 2008; Horowitz 2002). There are 
evidences of united claims40 but some villagers blame youngsters for the conflict, using means 
resulting in conflict with the police and security guards as they try to get easy access to a share 
(Marato 2011; Saunders 2011). To utilise the concepts of protest and claim-making this aspect 
is disregarded and the artisanal miners are treated as one group with no contradicting claims 
internally but it is an aspect that might be a target for further investigations.  
5.4.2.  Available sources   
Statements from the stakeholders of ABG/Barrick and the Tanzanian government are easily 
accessed through their official web-pages. The ABG and Barrick websites41 include various 
background information regarding the company and its operations, including the NMGM 
specifically. Additionally, development projects and official guidelines on how the company 
seeks to mitigate conflict can be found. 
Through the official website42 of the Tanzanian state, the official documents of the legal 
framework are available, along with various background information although, survey data is 
not up-to-date. Most of it, including the acts and laws are available in English, as English is 
40 LEAT for instance have lodged  a complaint to the Tanzanian Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance against AMGM/EAGM on behalf of some 1260 former small-scale miners, peasant farmers and 
other residents of Nyabigena and Nyabirama areas (LEAT 2003a). 
41 barrick.com and africanbarrickgold.com.
42 The web-page of the Tanzanian government (tanzania.go.tz – URT web1) contains sub-pages for each 
ministry and department, of which the sub-page of the MEM (tanzania.go.tz/ministriesf.html – URT web2) is 
the most relevant as it is the department managing the mining sector. 
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the official language of Tanzania along with Kiswahili43 and is the language of higher courts.  
These official sources of the company and the government are considered credibly44 to the 
point that statements are in fact representative of the stakeholders and information is correct. 
Additionally, representatives of both stakeholders have been interviewed by national as well 
as foreign media, so there is a good amount of articulated data, making these preferable as 
sources of data from these two stakeholders.
5.4.3.  Limited access to data on the artisanal miners
The artisanal miners on the other hand are less accessibly as they work informally and have no 
official channel or (union) representation. Although not much academic research has been 
conducted on this particular case, the violence has attracted the attention of scholars, national 
human rights organisations, the government, foreign activist groups, national and foreign 
media and a lot of people living in the area have already been interviewed. Although the 
perspectives have varied, relevant data in terms of quotes from former and current artisanal 
miners are availably from these sources as secondary data. 
5.5.  Method of secondary analysis of qualitative data 
There is direct access to data on two of the three stakeholders and data concerning artisanal 
miners in the area do exist. This has lead this author to use secondary analysis of qualitative 
data45 as the method of data collection, in which the data is treated as interviews - as 
articulations of the stakeholders. The advantage of this method is, that it utilises the combined 
resources of existing research and fieldwork, which have already gathered articulated data 
from the three stakeholders. This makes a good ground for getting data from many different 
representatives of each stakeholder group. This approach also makes for better comparison of 
data, which would have been harder utilising a multi-method approach. 
5.5.1.  Validation and quality of the secondary data and its related interview-
methods 
The use of secondary interview data and statements means that there is no control of the 
43 Which is the language of the majority of Tanzanians. Is also known as Swahili which however designates the 
culture of the inhabitants of the East African coast and the people who speak the language as well. 
44 Official sources of the government however, contain what I deem to be mistakes of typos and the like in the 
acts and the presentation is not a 100% consistent. For instance the first subsection of a paragraph (§) is 
sometimes printed as (1) but sometimes as (I), being capital “I” and characters are sometimes missing, 
confusing the exact number of the particular paragraph. 
45 See Bryman (2004: 414).
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interview methods utilised by the different sources and therefore no choice or control 
concerning the asked questions nor choice of respondents. It is therefore necessary to critically 
discuss and assess the interview methods of the relevant sources and hereby the quality of the 
data, and to what extent this data is useful to the analysis, as if it was a primary interview 
strategy.  
5.5.1.1.  Interview methods of secondary sources 
The report by Mlowe & Olengurumwa (2011) from the Legal and Human Rights Centre 
(LHRC) aims to determine the circumstances of the specific indecent in which five people 
were shot (see chapter 2). Besides basic observations in the case area, methodologically they 
conducted survey interviews with villagers and semi-structured interviews with local villagers, 
LHRC’s monitors, relatives of the deceased, local leaders and District Government officials, 
including the Regional Police Commander (RPC) of Tarime and Rory Police Special Zone, 
and the Tarime District Commissioner (DC). The interviews were conducted after May 16th 
2011 but it is not explicated when exactly in the report. Some of the quotes are in Kiswahili 
which are unsuitable as data46 for this thesis, because of lack of adequate English translation. 
The report does not state the asked questions explicitly. 
The Tanzania Human Rights Report (THRR 2010) by the LHRC is an annual report on the 
human rights situation in Tanzania, concerning civil and political rights, vulnerably groups, 
HIV/AIDS and corruption. At least 5000 people were randomly picked and directly 
interviewed. The research relied on field work, surveys, focus group discussions, media and 
online research (THRR 2010: xxvi). The problems around the NMGM comprise only a small 
part of the compiled report and much of the relevant data refers to the LHRC-report47 and 
additional information from THRR is mostly used to understand the social context of the data. 
An important resource is the study by Mwikwabe (2011) from the International Institute of 
Social Studies. This study revolves around the same topic as the thesis although, the focus is 
somewhat broader with emphasis on ASM-livelihood in relation to expansion of LSM in the 
area. The primary data collection is based on field-work conducted from June to August 2011 
(after the incident of May 16th). This includes semi-structured interviews with current and 
46 Quotes in Kiswahili can be translated to using Goggle Translate understandable phrases to but the translation 
is highly inaccurate. 
47 Although the LHRC-report was published later (2011) than the THRR (2010) report but the collected data 
from LHRC was obviously availably. 
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former artisanal miners, village leaders, company personnel, NGOs, government staff 
(anonymous) and an additional focus group discussion was utilised48. The interviews were 
conducted in the vernacular language of Kurya and Kiswahili and the quotes have been 
translated into English in the report (Mwikwabe 2011: 15). 
Quite a few different media articles are used as sources. The articles by Geoffrey York (2011a; 
2011b) from the American The Globe and Mail newspaper (online version) along with Cam 
Simpson (2010) from the American business and financial media Bloomberg are much cited in 
other articles. The articles are both lengthy compared to other articles used in this thesis and 
are based on observations and interviews, especially with artisanal miners and other villagers 
around the mine site49. Simpson specifically states that he conducted interviews with 28 
people, including victims’ relatives, witnesses, local officials and human rights-workers. Other 
articles includes the Tanzanian papers The Citizen50 (English version) and Guardian, along 
with other non-Tanzanian articles. These provide a few interviews with artisanal miners but 
are mostly used for quotes from company representatives and government officials. Again the 
limitation concerning the use of news articles as data is that only English articles were 
practicable. 
5.5.1.2.  Discussion of interview methods 
The semi-structured interview method utilised in the reports are useful to aim the questions 
toward specific issues but at the same time being able to ask follow-up questions depending 
on the particular answers. This method has provided useful data for this study although the 
sources have emphasised matters that are different from the focus of this study. There is a risk 
that the interviewer impose pre-conceived ideas into the responses. This risk is apparent when 
the sources do not state the questions. This is mitigated by using several sources and quotes.
The study by Mwikwabe (2011) additionally uses a focus group interview, a way to study the 
ways in which a group constructs meaning in relation to a topic (Bryman 2004: 346). In this 
study, the group consisted of villagers attracted by the opportunity to tell their story. 
According to Mwikwabe the focus group interview: “...helped to get general views of the  
difficulties people experiencing collectively as communities in North Mara” (Mwikwabe 
48 Additionally a survey was tried but was apparently rejected by many people on the ground that they have 
been filling many questionnaires without any results (Mwikwabe 2011: 15). 
49 York made a five-day visit in June to the NMGM the surrounding villages. Simpson interviewed 28 people, 
including victims’ relatives, witnesses, local officials and human rights-workers, conducted throughout 
December 2010. 
50 From IPP Media, one of East Africa's largest Media conglomerates which i.a. comprises nine newspapers, 
published in both English and Swahili.
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2011: 15). The study does not acknowledge the risk of generalisation but this does not present 
a big problem, as it constitutes only a part of my data. However, Mwikwabe is not explicit 
about the composition of the group interview (e.g. sex, age, current or former artisanal miner 
etc.) or the size, which puts some limitations on representation of the artisanal miners. 
The media articles are especially concerned about creating stories of oppressed and 
marginalised people, victimising the local communities. Quotes from the artisanal miners are 
very short and information about the respondents is only provided to the extent that it 
specifically supports the story. The use of quotes from the media articles run the highest risk 
of being out of context. The validity of these quotes however, is dependent on the broad 
definition of the artisanal miners in this thesis, and the aim of the thesis to find the perceived 
legitimacy to the claims of the stakeholders themselves, rather than try to judge such 
legitimacy objectively.
None of the sources clearly state whether responses originally were in English or were 
translated. ABG and government representatives are believed to respond in English due to 
their position of public representatives, whereas artisanal miners and other local villagers are 
believed to respond in local language51. Different ways of saying something and subtle layers 
of meaning, biases and interpretations can be lost in the translation process (Fontana & Frey 
2005: 707). Mlowe & Olengurumwa (2011) and THRR (2010) were both produced by 
Tanzanians and Mwikwabe is a Tanzanian as well. Together with the Tanzanian media sources 
these are regarded to make the best possibly interpretations in terms of translation, whereas 
the risk of misinterpretations in the American articles are more present. 
5.5.1.3.  Empathetic interviewing  
All the sources have a general sympathy towards the artisanal miners and they give a strong 
impression of them a being treated unfairly. Rather than being seen as a problem though this is 
considered a natural and even a beneficial part of empathetic interviewing. The interviewer 
becomes an advocate and partner in favour of the groups being studies, hoping to ameliorate 
the conditions of the interviewed (Fontana & Frey 2005: 696). This view disregards the 
interviewing as a neutral process of fact finding. This is very much in concordance with the 
constructionist stance, in which the researcher does in fact interact with the subjects being 
studied and the research results therefore reflects this interaction (Fontana & Frey 2005: 716). 
51 Kurya or Kiswahili as described in Mlowe & Olengurumwa (2011) and Mwikwabe (2011). 
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5.5.1.4.  Quality of data representation 
It must be considered to what extent each stakeholder group is represented in the individual 
quotes as well as in the combined utilised data set. Bryman (2004) argue that minimum 
requirements in the size of a sample of interviews is 20-30 (Bryman 2004: 335). The number 
of quotes of artisanal miners utilised in the analysis is below this number, but considering that 
Mwikwabe conducted the focus groups interview, and that Simpson interviewed 28 people, 
the sources of data can be said to be representative in accordance with Bryman. Additionally I 
state that because the quotes of artisanal miners are gathered from several different sources 
chosen independently, it ensures that a range of different individuals have been heard. Besides 
the use of data from focus group interviews strengthen the representation quality of the 
samples, because these are constructed in a social setting (Bryman 2004: 348). 
5.5.2.  Analysing and interpreting data 
The specific interview data have been chosen according to their relevance to claims and 
legitimacy of access to the gold. Direct quotes rather than author rewrites that incorporate 
them into their text, are preferred as this make for the best raw data. A few re-writes have been 
used because of the importance of their contents but in these cases, it is made explicitly that it 
is a re-write. However, as the constructionist position regards meanings of questions and 
responses  jointly constructed by the interviewer and the respondent, it must be considered 
limitation to the findings of this thesis that the data in either case have been interpreted 
beforehand. 
The approach to interpreted the quotes is similar to that of a thematic analysis with emphasis 
on what is said, which is then ordered thematically (Bryman 2004: 412). However, the theme 
in this analysis - legitimacy of access to the gold - has been chosen beforehand. The analysis is 
structured according to the different ways the stakeholders legitimise their claims. This 
thematic structure, rather than than by each stakeholder separately, is chosen because there are 
identical and overlapping ways of legitimising the claims, underlining the relational aspect of 
the conflict. The claims are then discussed in relation to the attributes of protest by Macamo, 
within the theoretical framework of contestation, protest and claim-making.
The analysis also discusses how the legitimacy of these claims are socially constructed in 
relation to the history of ASM and LSM in the area and the legal framework and the changes 
in claims this have brought. It finally discusses how the current circumstances are perceived 
by each stakeholder and this influences the perceived legitimacy of their claims. Herby the 
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answers to the first question are conditional to the analysis and the answers to the other sub-
questions, but as a perceived context rather than an external and objective reality. 
This thesis will now return to the studies empirical field an take the initial steps for the 
analysis by providing accounts of the origins of the conflict and then the legal framework and 
how this  have changed the access to the gold to each of the stakeholders.
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6.  The historical origins of the conflict 
To answer the first sub-question How was and how is the gold accessed and claimed by the 
stakeholders?, this chapter provides a historical review of ASM and the beginning of LSM in 
North Mara, to account for the origins of the conflict and how has marked a change in the 
access to the gold for each stakeholder. It will describe how rights were transferred, and how 
people were displaced and killed. The description must be regarded as storytelling and not an 
objective account of events, as there are inconsistent and contradicting versions of what 
exactly occurred. Instead it provides a basis to understand the individual, subjective 
perceptions of how such events have impacted and changed claims of access to gold and the 
circumstances under which these claims are legitimised. 
6.1.  Discovery of gold and forced displacement
Historically, the Nyamongo area, where the Nyabirama pit and a gold processing plant are 
located, has been inhabited by the Kurya tribe for centuries, in particular the Kenye clan. The 
area was largely involved in agriculture until gold was discovered by clan-members. Since 
then there has been little agriculture and members of the community have relied on ASM. 
In 1987 villagers from the five villages of Kerende, Kewanja, Nyamwaga, Genkuru and 
Nyangoto discovered gold deposits at Nyabigena and Nyabirama, located in the areas of 
Nyangoto and Kewanja, respectively. The gold deposits were divided into five mining claims 
which were allocated by the MEM to the five villages in 199152. The five villages then sub-
granted some mining rights to individuals, making it 13 PMLs in total. The villagers started 
ASM operations at the claims and in nearby areas, making heavy investments in construction 
of mine shafts and purchase of water pumps and other mining equipment, as well as the 
feeding and caring of individual53 miners working informally (LEAT 2003a;  LEAT 2003b; 
ICMM 2007: 54; Mwikwabe 2011: 60).
In August 1993, a locally registered company (Winani Mining) that held claims in the same 
area, sold their rights to EAGM/AMGM. In October 1994, this company started extensive 
drilling within its claim and later illegal drilling within the claims that belonged to the five 
52 Kewanja village was granted a Temporary Right (TR) 2/88; Kerende village was granted TR 5/88; Nyangoto 
village was granted TR 1/90; Nyamwaga was granted TR 2/90; and Genkuru was granted TR 1/91 (LEAT 
2003b). 
53 There exists no records of the numbers this involved. Considering that 40,000 people that has been displaced 
from the area and that 70,000-122,000 are now living around the mine at least 10,000 seems a fair estimate. 
36
villages. On August 30th, 1996, EAGM/AMGM was granted new mining licenses with respect 
to the same areas. The five villages and the individual claim holders agreed to sell their 
mining claims and their land to EAGM/AMGM in agreement with the local government. 
Allegedly however, this happened under illegal and irregular circumstances without proper 
consultation. People were evicted from the gold sites of Nyabigena and Nyabirama with the 
company promising to pay compensation (as required) to villagers for their loss of land54. By 
the year 2001, the compensation had still not been paid, and tired of waiting the evicted 
villagers began openly to challenge the rights exercised by EAGM/AMGM, reoccupying their 
lands and properties. On August 2nd 2001, the Tarime District Commissioner areas called on 
the villagers to vacate the Nyabigena and Nyabirama areas with immediate effect. The 
villagers refused and armed FFU forces invaded the villages and after four days of fighting, 
they violently drove the villagers out of Nyabigena and Nyabirama. Close to 40.000 people 
were evicted and hundreds of villagers, including village leaders, were arrested and jailed. 
Hereafter EAGM/AMGM went to build the Afrika Mashariki Gold Mine (now NMGM) 
which opened in November 2002 (ICMM 2007: 54; LEAT 2003a; LEAT 2003b; Mlowe & 
Olengurumwa: 2011: 4). 
This chapter has showed how access and rights to the gold deposits of Nyabigena and 
Nyabirama have changed and been transferred from the local artisanal miners and villagers to 
the the first LSM company, now inherited down to ABG, turning access into a risky affair for 
the artisanal miners.
54 Approximately 671 hectares although Placer Dome later claimed that this was only 450 hectares when they 
acquired the mine (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 4).
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7.  How the legal framework affects claims
In the reviewed literature the importance of the legal framework to the conflict was clearly 
suggested by several authors. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to discuss how the 
liberalisation of the mining sector and the formulated legal framework have created and 
changed the claims to access the gold, and and how this define the legal and non-legal claims 
of the stakeholders. Together with the previous chapter this will answer the first sub-question. 
The chapter will also serve as a description of the legal context of the conflict, as basis for 
how the stakeholders perceive this, which is relevant to the analysis in the next chapter. As a 
product of the Tanzanian government, the legislation reflects interest of the state and because 
it affects the access to the gold in North Mara for all the stakeholders the analysis will refer 
back to this chapter throughout.
7.1.  The history of gold mining in Tanzania
Gold was discovered in the Lake Victoria region in 1894, during the German colonial period 
and mining began in 1909. The German colonial government encouraged mineral exploitation 
by private companies and introduced a concession system, whereby companies were given 
exclusive mining rights to large areas. Corporate claims to access gold were therefore 
introduced right from the beginning of gold mining in Tanzania55 but the mineral resources 
(whether above or beneath the ground) were the property of the colonial government and 
companies had to be granted permission from the authorities to operate. Mineral prospecting 
and exploitation continued during British colonial rule (1918-1961). Private prospecting for 
and extraction of various minerals was encouraged under these same rules, with operations 
peaking in 194056. With the beginning of the World War II however, production declined 
(Lange 2006: 2-3; SID 2009: 21-22). 
Alongside LSM companies a few artisanal miners often congregated illegally around virgin 
exploration sites and mines, often re-mining company waste or marginal ground (Mwaipopo 
et al. 2004: 25). After independence in 1961, mining (along with a number of other industries) 
was nationalised in 1967 and foreign and domestic capitalists were expropriated and new 
private investment discouraged (Cooksey & Kelsall 2011: 17, 20; Lange 2006: 2-3). In 1972, 
the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) was established to operate the sector (Lange 2011: 
6). The Tanzanian state held hereby exclusive rights and claims to mining, excluding any 
55 Then called Tanganyika.
56 It contributed to about 90% of the value of the mineral production (Lange 2006: 3).
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legal, private LSM or ASM operations and ASM production declined and ceased in the early 
1970s (Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 26). 
With the (first) Mining Act of 1979 all mineral resources became vested ownership of the 
state. It provided Tanzanians with the opportunity to formally engage in ASM activities 
through prospecting rights in areas designated for prospecting and to post claims within these 
areas (Jønsson & Fold 2009: 213). This Act created the first possibility for artisanal miners to 
engage in formal operations by themselves and to acquire legal access to gold. The claim-titles 
that the villages of Kerende, Kewanja, Nyamwaga, Genkuru and Nyangoto acquired in 1997 
were granted on this legal foundation.  
7.2.  Liberalisation of the mining sector
The period from 1979 however, was marked by a severe economic decline in Tanzania and the 
nationalised mining companies performed poorly, contributing to only 0.3 percent of the 
national revenue in 1988. There was little investment in the sector and the greater share of 
recovered gold and gemstones were smuggled out of the country (Cooksey & Kelsall 2011: 
76; Lange 2006: 3). In 1986, Tanzania agreed to a structural adjustment programme designed 
by the WB, in which internal and external trade was liberalised (Lange 2006: 3). In 1992, the 
WB published its “Strategy for African Mining” arguing that the endorsement of reformed 
mining codes could transform the underperforming African mining sector into a driver of 
economic recovery (WB 1992). The WB assisted57 the Tanzanian government in creating 
relevant mining legislation in order to attract foreign investment to the sector. This lead to the 
current legal, mining framework in Tanzania and a substantial rise in mining operations by 
foreign mining companies (Lange 2011: 6).
7.3.  Legislation and mining policies 
The legislation relevant to mineral exploration and exploitation making up the legal 
framework consists of:
• The Constitution 1977/1998
• The Mineral Policy 1997 (and The Mineral Policy 200958)
• The Mining Act 1998 (and The Mining Act 201059)
57 Although some argues that the WB, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the donor community 
imposed such policies in return for loan agreements and aid (Bryceson et al. 2010: 355; THRR 2010: 222).
58 The Mineral Policy 1997 was revised in 2009 (URT 2009) but the 2009 edition is merely a confirmation of 
the 1997 version, although with an enhanced gender focus  (THRR 2010 223-224). 
59  The Mining Act 1998 was revised in 2010 but  the 2010 edition only made minor changes in provision in 
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• The Land Act 1999 and The Village Land Act 1999
7.3.1.  The constitution 1977 (199860)
The constitution is relevant by §9(c) and §9(i) on the preservation and harness of natural 
resources for development of the people and the common good, and §27(1) and §27(2) 
referring to the duty of the people to protect the natural resources and safeguard the property 
of the state authority and its people respectively (URT 1977: §9(c), §9(i), §27(1), §27(2)). 
7.3.2.  The Mineral Policy 1997 
The Mineral Policy 1997 is mainly a statement of intent with the objective of establishing a 
regulatory framework to promote the mining sector (mineral development and exploitation), 
attract FDI to it, and to regulate and improve ASM (Jønsson & Fold 2009: 214; URT 1997: v, 
§3.3.3; URT web 2). In recognition of private sector development and market-oriented 
economic management, this policy marked a shift, from government as owner and operator of 
the mining sector to that of facilitator and regulator (URT 1997: 3). The policy recognises the 
positive contribution of ASM to the economy and includes strategies to support and improve 
the sector (URT 1997: 14; §3.3.6). This is largely an effort to formalise and transform 
(rationalise) artisanal mining into organised small-scale mining (URT 1997: §3.3.6.(i)). It 
envisions small- and large-scale mining operating on equal footing, and the policy seeks to 
harmonise their operations by streamlining the licensing procedures and ensuring fairness in 
this process to ensure exclusivity of licensed areas (URT 1997: §3.3.3(i); §3.3.3(iii)). An 
important principle in this regard is the first come, first served basis, under which ASM and 
LSM apply for rights on equal basis and that the first one to (rightfully) apply for a mineral 
right will also be the one granted ownership of this mineral right (URT 1997: §3.3.3.(ii)). 
Furthermore, it seeks to promote partnerships between ASM and LSM to facilitate technology 
transfer and optimise the exploitation of mineral resources (URT 1997: §3.3.6 (iii)).
7.3.3.  The Mining Act 1998
The Mining Act 1998 is a revision of The Mining Act 1979 to accommodate the changes of 
government policy expressed in The Mineral Policy 1997 (Lange 2006: 7). The Mining Act 
1998 is the regulatory scheme containing the regulative provisions of the mining sector. It 
terms of compensation, royalties and duration (THRR 2010 223-224). 
60 Is based on the 1977 edition of the constitution but incorporates and consolidates all amendments made in the 
constitution since its enactment by the Constituent Assembly in 1977 up to the 30th of June, 1995 (URT 1977). 
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establishes that the mineral wealth and control of this is all vested in the state61 (URT 1998: 
§562). It also specifies the different mineral rights (licenses) that may be granted by the MEM, 
including exploration and exploitation for ASM and LSM respectively (URT 1998: §763/64). 
Under this act, holders of mineral rights are entitled to exclusive right of ownership of the 
mining operations and the mineral recovered, as well as complete power to dispose the said 
mineral recovered (URT 1998: §43., §49--(1)65). This provision makes a mining license a de 
facto property right, granting the holder the exclusive right to harvest the profit from all 
minerals extracted (minus taxes and royalties) within the mining concession. It is by this legal 
right, granted by the state, that ABG claims access to all the gold within its concession. 
Therefore the police is obliged to secure its mining concession and prevent people from 
invading it. 
The state has no longer any de jure claim of access to the gold, but as the minerals are vested 
in the state and it is the government that is granting rights, the state is still to be considered a 
pseudo claimant. 
7.3.3.1.  Special Mining Licenses and Mining Development Agreements
The Mining Act 1998 introduced Special Mining Licenses (SMLs), which put on obligations 
for the license holder to explicit informations about the planned mining operation and to 
employ and train citizens of Tanzania (URT 1998: §44). The Minister of MEM may enter into 
a Mining Development Agreement (MDA) with a claim holder of a SML, in which special 
provision for the payment of royalties, taxes, fees and other fiscal imposts can be made, while 
binding the state to guarantee the long term  fiscal stability of a mining project (URT 1998: 
§10). A MDA is a private and confidential agreement between the Tanzanian government and 
the mining company. Such agreements were expressly prohibited in The Mining Act 1979 in 
order to discourage corruption and conflicts of interest (SID 2009: 36). These conditions 
established in The Mining Act 1998 give preferential treatment to foreign mining companies 
and have heavily contributed to the large influx of foreign companies. 
The original mining licenses66 granted to EAGM/AMGM on August 30th 1996 was re-granted 
as SMLs67 on February 7th, 2000 after The Mining Act 1979 was replaced by The Mining Act 
61 Which is normal for most countries (Hilson 2002a: 68).
62 Under Part II - General principles of the act.
63 Divison A of Part IV: a prospecting licence; a retention licence. Division B of Part IV: a special mining 
licence; a mining licence; a gemstone mining licence; Division D of Part IV: a primary prospecting licence; a 
primary mining licence (URT 1998: §7.(a), (b), (c)).
64 See URT web2 for related sizes, duration and fees. 
65 The “--” is probably a mistake and should have been a “.”.
66 ML 17/96 and ML 18/96. 
67 SML 17/96 and SML 18/96.  
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1998. Those licenses now held by ABG were renewed in 2012 for additional 15 years (ABG 
2012e; LEAT 2003b).
7.3.3.2.  Artisanal and small-scale mining in the Mineral Act 1998
To engage in official, registered small-scale mining activities the  acquisition of a Primary 
Mining Licence (PML) is required. A PML is granted for seven years and gives the owner the 
exclusive right to exploit an area designated by the Minster of the MEM. The PML can be 
mortgaged, renewed or transferred to another holder, including foreign firms (URT 2010: §9., 
§55.-§57.68). According to the act, ASM is exclusive for Tanzanians and companies which are 
exclusively owned by Tanzanians (Tesha, 2000: 2, URT 1998: §8,(2)69). The act designates 
that the Minister of MEM can reserve specific areas for ASM activities (URT 1998: 2370; 
Tesha 2000: 7). Not many areas and non in North Mara have been preserved for ASM 
purposes however (ARM 2011: 4, 8-9). 
The mining acts and policies have reintroduced the corporate body as a mineral rights holder 
and reduced the involvement of the state, but also made it possibly for artisanal miners to 
acquire titles. However, this act officially prohibited any mining activities without granted 
mineral rights, making informal ASM illegal (URT 1998: §6.-(I)71).
7.3.4.  The Land Act 1999 and the Village Land Act 1999 
The Land Act 1999 (URT 1999a) and the Village Land Act 1999 (URT 1999b) are also 
relevant to discuss as LSM takes up large amounts of land. As seen in the previous chapter the 
company had to acquire land and 40.000 people had to be relocated to allow the mine and its 
infrastructure to be built (ICMM 2007: 54). The Land Act 1999 confirms tenures that were 
introduced under colonialism: granted right of occupancy, customary tenure, and leasehold 
estates (Lange 2008: 5; URT 1999a: §472). Customary rights to land are treated more 
specifically in the Village Land Act 1999 (URT 1999b), developed to ensure that existing 
customary land rights are being legally secured (Lange 2008: 5; URT 1999b: §3.-(1)-(c)). 
According to the Village Land Act 1999 Customary Right of Occupancy is a legal right to 
occupy and use the land based on historical occupation and use of an area73, which is in every 
68 Part IV, Division C
69 Under Restrictions on granting Mineral Rights. 
70 (b) of “Reserved Area”
71 “(I)” is probably a mistake and should have been “(1)”.
72 Categories; (a), (b), (c)
73 “All members of the village who have held land without disturbance since 1970, or been allocated land by a 
Village Council since, a re considered to be holding customary rights of occupancy to that land [...]. These 
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respect is of equal status to a granted right of occupancy (URT 1999b: §14; §18.-(1); Willy 
2003: 36). All public land is vested in the President on behalf of the citizens, in the same way 
as minerals (URT 1999a: §1-(1)-(a); URT 1999b: 3.-(1)-(b)). Hereby, people do not own land 
but have user rights. In North Mara, villagers  have been using customary  rights for many 
years, with no official registration or certificate, and carried out mining without licenses, but 
according to The Land Act 1999 minerals are by definition not a part of land in Tanzania 
(Mwikwabe 2011: 23; URT 1999a: 2674, §22.(2)75). Rights to sub-soil minerals are only 
obtained by mineral rights and the two acts hold no support for ASM activities through lands 
rights. 
7.4.  Transferability of rights and compensation 
Both the land and mining legislations are built on the same principles of upholding the 
exclusivity of rights, with secured tenure throughout the tenure period, and of the 
transferability of rights (Lugoe 2011: 3). PMLs can be transferred to SMLs (ASM rights to 
LSM rights) by means of agreement between the two parties76 (Tesha 2000: 2; URT 1998: §9-
41)77). Land tenure rights can also be transferred from one party to another, with the consent of 
both parties (URT 1999a: 3378). However, the government can choose to convert (transfer) the 
tenure right of village land into “General” or “Reserved” land if this is in the “public interest” 
(URT 1999b: §4.(1)-(2)). This state expropriation clausal allows the government to order 
people to move in cases where the government needs the land for “development purposes” 
like mining, even if local people are working there as artisanal miners. Villages have little or 
no power to object to loosing land to mining companies if the government sees this investment 
as being in the “public interest” (Lange 2008: 25). When minerals are discovered, the land 
turns into mineral land and falls under The Mining Act 1998, which overrules The Land and 
Village Land Acts (Jønsson & Fold 2009: 216; Lugoe 2011: 3). However according to the law, 
no land can be transferred until the amount, method and timing of compensation79 to the 
people may freely apply to have these rights registered.” (Willy 2003: 36). 
74 Definition of land under Interpretation. 
75 Under Incidents of  granted right of occupancy. 
76 The government envision the case when a small-scale miner wants to involve foreign investors in its small-
scale mining operation (Tesha 2000: 2).
77 The assigned number “9-41)” is most likely a mistake and should probably have been named “9.-(1)”
78 Definition of transfer under Interpretations. 
79 The basis of compensation is to be value of the land itself together with unexhausted improvements, as 
determined by its current open market value, assessment of lost income, or by replacement costs, and this 
valuation is to be prepared by a qualified surveyor (Willy 2003: 51). 
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villagers has been agreed upon ((URT 1999a: §1-(9)80/81, §5.-(7); URT 1999b: §4.-(8)). 
Compensation must i.a.82 include payment allowance for the loss of profits to all those directly 
affected (Willy 2003: 51) but because minerals however, are separate from land rights the 
dispossession of ASM opportunities are not compensated for. Villagers must be included in 
these negotiations concerning compensation and relocated accordingly (URT 1999b: §4.-(5)). 
It is the state that is responsible for compensating villagers but in the case of North Mara it 
became the company (then AMGM/EAGM) that paid the compensation (Mlowe & 
Olengurumwa 2011: 5). 
State expropriation for the interest of the public is common all over the world and not a 
problem in itself. However, it becomes controversial in the light of the debate on whether 
LSM is in fact in the interest of the public and because of the excessive extent to which it is 
executed, displacing a large number of people (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 310; Lange 2011: 4-
5; LEAT 2003b; Newbury 2011: xix).
The granting of SMLs to the company, the transfer PMLs from the villages to the company, 
and the transfer of land to be reserved to the LSM operation, in total grant ABG de facto 
property rights of not only the minerals extracted but of the land as well, leaving no legal 
possibilities for artisanal miners to mine the gold in the area.  
80 Under Part 11 - Fundamental principles of National Land Policy.
81 The “(9)” is most likely a mistake and should probably have been “(g)”. 
82 As well as payment of a disturbance allowance and transport allowance.
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8.  Analysis: The legitimacy of claims 
This chapter will analyse how the claims of access to the gold are articulated by the different 
stakeholders, how the claims are legitimised, and what the contents and targets of these claims 
are, based on the theoretical concepts of contestation, protest and claim-making previously 
discussed. It will show how articulation of claims also lead to counter claims, de-legitimising 
the original claim, thus strengthening legitimacy in the view of the stakeholder articulating the 
counter claim. It will analyse how these claims of the stakeholders are socially constructed 
under the perceived circumstances and changes affecting the claims. 
8.1.  Historical legitimacy of the artisanal miners' claims
According to Boniface Magao Mwita, a resident in the Nyatongo village, who was engaged in 
mining activities in the area at the time the EAGM came, people in the area have been 
involved in mining activities for at least 50 years (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 18). The 
villagers have a perception of a long history of artisanal mining in the area and therefore of a 
historical right to access the gold in the area. This perception has been strengthened by the fact 
that ASM existed prior to LSM in North Mara and the perception is reflected in the media as 
well; “Villagers, too, are hunting the ore on the North Mara land that their ancestors worked 
for decades, sometimes paying with their lives.” (Simpson 2010). The historical legitimacy to 
access the gold is furthermore linked to cultural beliefs, about the gold being owned by gods 
or spirits and rewarded to the people in the areas by letting them discover the gold deposits. 
“To the people from the area, the gold belongs to the gods or spirits and they have to have  
regard for the spiritual influence more than geological information.” (Mlowe & 
Olengurumwa 2011: 4). 
There is also a common feeling of historical attachment to the land among the artisanal miners 
in North Mara. In his research, Mwikwabe (2011) found that the interviewed told of being 
separated from their ancient’s graves, which has strong meaning to them (Mwikwabe 2011: 
43). According to the author the company has failed to differentiate cultural attachment of 
local people to the land from the economic value associated with the land (Mwikwabe 2011: 
37). Lugoe (2011) comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that mining seeks to take away the 
ancestral land rights of communities and people’s attachment to ancestral heritage in ‘the 
public interest, and that money cannot compensate for this deep attachment (Lugoe 2011: 3). 
This indicates a feeling of historical and cultural attachment to the land which, according to 
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Hilson (2002c: 67-68) and Horowitz (2002: 46-47), are key attributes of indigenous people's 
resistance against mining projects. 
Several quotes reveal a strong dissatisfaction towards the fact that it is foreigners, rather than 
(local) Tanzanians, who benefit from the gold and that the government is to blame, betraying 
its people. Before-mentioned Mwita says that it is the whites, who are protected by the police 
force in Tarime, who are the intruders, thus they will keep on going to the mining sites even if 
all of them are killed (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 18). A villager named Mkwave Mwita is 
quoted: ’’it is Canadians that are reaping more benefits from Tanzanian mineral resources  
than Tanzanians themselves.” (THISDAY 2009). This feeling of betrayal can be regarded as 
outrage according to the concepts of claim-making and protest. It can seem somewhat racist 
but it points to a claim to the gold through nationality. This is actually in line with the 
constitution, proclaiming that the mineral wealth should benefit the Tanzanian people, as well 
as the Village Land Act 1999, stating that expropriation from land is feasibly only if it is 
deemed an investment in the interest of the public. This suggests that the actions of the 
artisanal miners involves an aspect of political contestation as they act to acquire benefits of 
the gold themselves, challenging the government's management of the natural wealth as 
unconstitutional and not benefiting the people. 
8.2.  The legal claims of the artisanal miners
As seen from the historical accounts of the conflict in this thesis, the five villages of Kerende, 
Kewanja, Nyamwaga, Genkuru and Nyangoto acquired PMLs to the gold deposits at the 
Nyabigena and Nyabirama areas. The villagers have lived there under customary land rights, 
but as discussed in the previous chapter, land rights do not include minerals in the Tanzanian 
legislation. The two rights are often confused by villagers83 when they are claiming legal 
rights to access the gold.  
8.2.1.  Claims of mineral rights 
The historical account also suggests that this happened under illegal and irregular 
circumstances. According to the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT), both the 
mining company and government officials “...exerted undue influence upon the leadership of  
the villages to force them to illegally and irregularly sell the claim areas legally granted and 
held by the said five villages.” (LEAT 2003b). The granting of mining licenses to EAGM in 
83 As well as by media. 
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the same areas excluded these claims (LEAT 2003b). 
Elia H (age 60) who had a PML and were among the few of those that bargained with 
EAGM/AMGM:
...we were called and it was first time to involve in negotiation, I remember some of 
us tried to reject the negotiation but other accepted just little amount of allowances 
paid per day by Company and we did not have lawyers but the Company had a 
lawyer… (Mwikwabe 2011: 60)
…our feelings were that after surrendered our mining licences as required by law 
then the company could employ villagers in the new system of gold production…
(Mwikwabe 2011: 60)
Actually there exists no legal ground according to which owners of PMLs are required to sell 
their claims. Companies can make agreements with artisanal miners, so that the larger 
companies are able to access the licensed area of the artisanal miners. Often the agreements 
contain provisions allowing the company to buy out the artisanal miner if the miner wishes to 
do so, depending on the potentiality of the property (Tesha 2000: 12). This is however, only to 
the extent that such a provision is in fact existing in their mutual agreement but lack of 
knowledge and in some cases education of the artisanal miners can result in one-sided 
exploration agreements, which favour the larger mining company (ARM 2011: 10; Mwaipopo 
et al. 2004: 9; Tesha 2000: 12). The quotes above also shows how the artisanal miners 
believed that  they would be able to enter into the new system of gold production, as the 
original agreement contained obligations of local investments and preferential hiring of 
members of villages. But it is not legal to conduct preferential local hiring to those from the 
North Mara region nor does the company require labour size equivalent to number engaged in 
ASM in the area (ICMM 2007: 52; Mwikwabe 2011: 60). Therefore the normative 
expectations of the artisanal miners were violated legitimising a feeling of outrage. 
According to LEAT, the villagers were never shown the mining license of EAGM. 
Accusations of illegal and forced sells of PMLs are therefore actually de-legitimising the 
mining licenses of ABG, reaffirming the claims to access the gold of the artisanal miners. 
Another source of anger and outrage is the lack of inclusion of the informal artisanal miners in 
the negotiations, concerning the selling of the claims. The many people who were engaged in 
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informal ASM at the time EAGM/AMGM came to the area, were not included in the 
negotiations, only village representatives and the individual PML owners were (Mwikwabe 
2011: 60). 
Although the exact circumstances under which the mining licenses were transferred to the 
EAGM company are uncertain, it is clear that many former and current artisanal miners do not 
perceive the claims of the company to be legal. 
8.2.2.  Claims of land rights 
The villagers' historical presence in the area earned them customary rights to the land. The 
land of Nyabigena and Nyabirama have however been reserved for the mining company to 
accommodate space for the NMGM. The original contract for the sale of this lands was 
between the government of the District of Tarime and the EAGM company. As found in the 
previous chapter, it is is required by law that villagers take part in negotiations when the state 
wants to transfer village land to reserved land. The villagers claim that the original contract 
between EAGM and the government was concluded without adequate consultation or 
approval of the majority of villagers (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 4). Furthermore, the 
language in the contract was English and not Kiswahili, the language of the majority of 
Tanzanians, making it difficult for local villagers to read the document and to make 
themselves assured that it was a fair agreement (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 4-5). 
Additionally, LEAT has directed their complaint against both government officials and the 
mine management, and holds that two government officials of the District of Tarime, had put 
undue pressure on 60 villagers to make them accept compensations that were too low, and that 
the officials had threatened them with arrests if they didn’t comply (LEAT 2003b). 
This way in which the NMGM was established has led to a feeling of being deceived among 
the villagers, hence a sense of wrong-doings entailing feelings of outrage (York 2011b). 
Although the Tanzanian state should be the body responsible for paying compensation, in this 
case it has been for the different companies to do so hence, demands of compensation are now 
directed towards ABG, because ABG has inherited the contents of this original contract. Many 
however,have still not been properly compensated for the loss of land and many have cases in 
court (Mwikwabe: 30-31).
The artisanal miners generally confuses land rights with mineral rights, which is a common 
misconception among local people (Kulindwa et al. 2003: 91-92 in Lange 2008: 14). This is 
also the case in North Mara although, I will state that it is rather another perception of claims. 
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The artisanal miners do simply not differentiate between mineral and land rights in their 
claims of access to the gold, but have a pragmatic approach to rights. They have a strong 
feeling of being wronged and outrage among the artisanal miners has grown out of this, 
making entrance into the ABG mining concession to scope for gold minerals a legitimate form 
of articulation of claims, even if it involves violence, as the following quote states. Maheri C 
(age 43): 
…the Company doesn’t want to listens our concerns, the government is quiet, the 
police are murderous and cases in court take long time unusual…this conflict will 
end if we increase use of force… (Mwikwabe 2011: 37) 
8.3.  Legal claims and property rights of African Barrick Gold
As opposed to early post-independence, when mines were national property, the liberalisation 
of the mining sector has invited foreign LSM companies to extract minerals, particularly gold. 
By granting minerals to these companies the state is outsourcing the extraction of gold. As 
argued in the previous chapter, the mineral rights of ABG/Barrick, along with the transfer of 
the land to reserved land by the government grants the company exclusive rights, which 
effectively are de facto property rights. The claims of ABG are legally founded and when 
people are stealing gold sand or waste rock, or even just are physically present within the mine 
concession of ABG they are violating the exclusive rights of ABG. 
8.3.1.  Criminalising the artisanal miners 
The company and the government are branding the artisanal miners as criminals, justifying the 
killings of them. Barrick has expressed concerns about the police shootings, but has also 
pointed out that the intruders84 are illegally trespassing (York 2011b). This opinion is by large 
shared by the police. Constantine Massawe, RPC of Tarime and Rorya Police Special Zone:
The police officers are there not only to protect the mines but also the properties in 
the mine. Villagers are sometime invading the mine to collect mineral remnants, then 
in the course of preventing them police have to use gun and bomb to surpass 
them….as the result some are killed and some are injured. (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 
2011: 14)
84 Villagers entering the mine illegally to scrounge for rock have used the English word “intruder” to describe 
themselves and the word  has entered the Swahili language, with no negative connotation, as the name of a 
new occupation that can produce money and even wealth (York 2011b). 
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District officials have also openly admitted that there have been many incidents of killings 
around the mine, but on the other side they have justified the killings by saying that, all those 
who have been killed and injured by security guards have been intruders at the mine (THRR 
2010: 48). This is not exclusive to this case. Framing artisanal miners as encroachers, 
trespassers, criminals, intruders, bandits, criminals and the like has been a commonplace way 
for LSM corporations, to defend their use of security forces to remove ASM-groups from their 
legally endorsed concessions (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 306, 308; Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 27, 
42). According to Andrew Wray, head of investor relations for ABG: “People killed or injured 
after crossing into the mine area shouldn’t be considered small-scale miners because they 
were all trespassing and therefore acting illegally,”. (Simpson 2010). This is also targeted at 
the government, urging it to improve law and order, referring to protection of their exclusive 
right to mine within its concession. 
Government efforts to transform artisanal mining into formal small-scale mining imply a 
sharp distinction between the two (which this paper does not make). 
Formal small-scale mining takes place legally with miners in possession of a primary 
mining license, which thus give them a legal right to mine...Informal small-scale 
miners or artisanal miners, on the other hand, hardly ever have a legal right to the 
mineral deposits they exploit and monitoring of their activities is problematic. (Tesha 
2000: 5) 
The criminalisation of artisanal miners by the government is taken further by referring to the 
problems of ASM:
Although artisanal mining provides a source of income, it engenders a host of 
undesirable effects. Being uncontrolled, it is often unsafe, unhealthy and 
environmentally unsound, and can give rise to social problems and crime. It is a 
wasteful utilisation of mineral assets and full economic benefits are seldom realised 
through the activity. (Tesha 2000: 5)
This statement is branding artisanal miners as criminals who should have no access to gold at 
all. It is based upon negative hazards associated with ASM; negative environmental impacts 
such as mercury pollution, use of child labour, health hazards etc. (see Chapter 1). 
Additionally illegal mining activities are condemned by the the chairman of the Tanzania 
Chamber of Minerals and Energy (TCME), Mr Ami Mpungwe:
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It has to be deeply appreciated that for every ounce of ore, diamond or tanzanite that 
is stolen or mined illegally, the state suffers substantially in terms of taxation, 
reputation and its law enforcement responsibility... (The Citizen 2011b)
Obviously, the state has to condemn any kind of theft but it must be remembered that informal 
ASM is illegal, according to The Mining Act 1998, and any claims of informal artisanal 
miners are hereby strongly de-legitamised as being harmful to the state. 
8.3.2.  Securing the claim
This branding defends efforts to improve security to safeguard the continued, exclusive right 
of ABG to access the gold and and ultimately shoot intruders. Barrick’s PR and 
Communications manager Teweli Teweli states how security arrangements around the mine 
should be improved  following the incident of May 16th: 
Africa Barrick Gold (ABG) will continue to work towards the longer term resolution 
of law and order, which includes a combination of capacity building in the 
Government, increased community investment and greater engagement with the 
locals to resolve long term legacy issues. Over the past year we have been upgrading 
the physical security arrangements at all of our sites, initially focused on securing 
camp perimeters and then securing the operating area of each site and North Mara is 
part of this programme. Security infrastructure and resources across the site continue 
to be upgraded. (The Citizen 2011a)
In this statement it is interesting how law and order are coupled with security of the sites. This 
analysis interpret the statement of law and order as strongly related to legal property rights. 
The security upgrade includes installation of additional perimeter fencing and walls, installing 
cameras in sensitive areas, implementing personal radio tracking, reviewing options for in-car 
video cameras, and conducting a safety education programme with the local community to 
improve understanding of the inherent dangers associated with illegal mining and intrusions 
into the mine site (Barrick 2011a). 
8.4.  The perception of mining and development
The criminalisation of ASM, along with preferential treatment of LSM companies point to a 
fundamental basis of the mining legislation by which LSM claims are supported by 
government and ASM claims are not. The government largely prefers that people refrain from 
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ASM activities as reflected in a speech by the minister of finance Hon Basil P. Mramba on the 
budget for 2001/2002:
Rural poverty is to be reduced from the current level of 57 percent to 29 percent by 
2010. The best way of achieving these targets is to fully implement the agreed 
policies and strategies for agriculture, livestock, tourism, basic industries and mining. 
However the people themselves are the only ones who can sustainably uplift their 
living standards by employing their skills and hard work, especially in the 
agricultural sector. (Mramba 2001)
This quote refers to The Mineral Policy 1997 and The Mining Act 1998, policies formulated to 
improve the contribution of the sector to national, economic development. Investing in the 
mining sector is still widely applied as a development strategy and the WB is encouraging 
countries to commit to the growth of the sector (Bebbington et al. 2008: 889; Greenen 2011: 
149). This notion of a positive relationship between LSM and development is very apparent in 
the Mineral Policy 1997. The Tanzanian government argues that LSM offers a good tax-base, 
contributing to state revenues85 and generating foreign exchange earnings, and that it has great 
potential for both forward and backward linkage of the Tanzania’s economy, whereas informal 
ASM on the other hand does not (Hentschel el al. 2003: 41; Tesha 2000: 14; URT 1997: v, 
§3.3.3.; URT web2). In spite of studies indicating disappointing results at a national level (as 
discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis), the state not only use this notion of a positive 
relationship between LSM and development to support and legitimise the claims of ABG to 
access the gold, but to de- legitimise the similar artisanal claims as well. 
ABG/Barrick also argue for the positive impact of its mining operations. Aaron Regent, 
president and Chief Executive Officer of Barrick:
Some suggest we shut the mine. We think shutting down a mine that provides 
employment and other meaningful benefits to thousands is not a good solution. The 
economic and social impact would be severe for the community. (Regent 2011)
Although, the Tanzanian government has acknowledged the positive contribution of ASM to 
the economy in The Mineral Policy 1997, the granting of mineral rights to ABG along with 
the dispossession of the same rights of artisanal miners, show how the government ranks LSM 
above ASM. The state legitimises the right to access the gold of ABG by the notion of a 
85 The TCME executive secretary, Mr Emmanuel said that the government’s revenue in the form of taxes 
amounted to $120.5 million in 2010 compared to just $2.1 million in 1997 (The Citizen 2011b). The 
contribution of mining to the GDP has increased from 1,6% in 2000 to 3,3% in 2010 (NBS 2011: 16). But this 
contribution is projected  to rise to a 10% contribution of GDP in 2025 (URT web3).  
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positive relationship between LSM and development. In the same breathe, artisanal miners are 
criminalised by the company and the government, and as the mineral rights of ABG ultimately 
are de facto property rights granted by the state, violent means to defend its exclusive claims 
to access the gold are ultimately justified. 
8.4.1.  Development initiatives and legitimacy 
The original agreement of the transfer of land to EAGM also included social development 
obligations, which were never complied with (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 5). In order to 
improve its relationship with the local communities and avoid conflict, ABG/Barrick has 
initiated a lot of developments initiatives, along with procedures for peaceful existence, much 
in line with CSR-approaches. This has included annually community investments, investments 
to connect North Mara to the Tanzanian power grid, support of the refurbishment and building 
of a number of schools and also supports a number of scholarship programmes in the North 
Mara region (ABG 2012b; ABG 2012c; Barrick 2011a). However, development initiatives do 
not simply remove the claims of the artisanal miners. Abel M (age 62) answers to whether he 
was satisfied with the company’s education programme (see ABG 2012c): 
...what people want is to engage in economic activities to have something to eat, it is 
irrelevant for this Company to claim that has been sending children to schools is like 
exchanging education for gold… (Mwikwabe 2011: 36-37)
This further underlines the claim among the local communities of access to the gold, which 
cannot simply be replaced by development initiatives. Mwikwabe (2011) identified feelings 
among villagers of restricted access to economic activities, rather than acceptance of 
development initiatives (Mwikwabe 2011: 37). This is in opposition to the assumption of 
ABG, which recently have signed the VBA with the seven villages to seek an end to the 
unsettled issues (see chapter 2). Hereby, they are ignoring mineral rights that the local 
communities originally held, and more importantly the maintained claim of access to the gold 
of the artisanal miners. Instead ABG is regarding the conflict merely as a compensation issue 
which can be settled by an adjustment of costs and benefits, which is much in line with the 
argument of the reviewed literature on Mine-Community conflicts. 
8.5.  Corruption, bribes and legitimacy
A much different source of disputes and legitimacy is corruption and bribes. Corruption and 
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bribes are part of everyday life around the NMGM. Villagers bribe86 the police in order for 
them to access the waste rocks, a practice called “Mchongo” (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 
14). An anonymous gold broker from Nyamongo have said: 
…if you want to survive here you have to collaborate with police on duty…we are 
bribing to get into pits to collect gold sands, when killing happen is when many 
people want to force into pits without paying money… (Mwikwabe 2011: 45)
Maulidi Issa, a villager who has worked as an intruder for many years: “The police are 
benefiting from the conflicts,” “They are becoming wealthy from the bribes.” (York 2011b). 
According to Charcha Murwa, the head of Foundation Help87, the local guards are extorting 
money from artisans miners to allow them access to the premises of the mine (Bariyo & 
Steward 2009). Gerhard Hermann, ABG production manager says it can't be held responsible 
for the actions of the police guards. "They are deployed by government and draw a 
government salary, they are not on our payroll," (Bariyo & Steward 2009). The police are, of 
course, sanctioning any such practice but also suggesting that ABG employees are involved 
(Marato 2011). Constantine Massawe, RPC of Tarime and Rorya Police Special Zone:
Gold concentrate is grouped according top grades, now how come people invade the 
mine and identify the one of highest grade and go straight to it if not mine workers 
providing leading information to the invaders? (Marato 2011) 
Some villagers have questioned the fairness of granting access to the lucrative sand to only 
those who are capable of bribing insiders. As area residents they deem it their right to have a 
share and thus form gangs of machete and spear-wielding invaders who clash with the police 
(Maroto 2011).
Thus there are different stories as to how exactly this corruption and bribing takes place and 
who exactly are involved. For the artisanal miners in North Mara bribing is a mean to make a 
living. Bribing is a practical expression of their claim to access the gold. It holds no moral 
resentment and is legitimised beyond legal terms, which makes corruption and legitimacy 
interlinked. The employers are tipping off the intruders and the police accepts bribes for 
access to the pits in an informal contract-like situation. It is when this “contract” is broken that 
86 The amounts varies from source to source. It ranges from a dollar or two a person (York 2011b), several 
dollars a person (Guardian 2011), 30,000-50,000 TShs a person (≈ $18-30) (Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 
14)  to one million TShs (≈ $650) for a group in exchange for a half-hour on the mining site (Marato 2011).  
87 A local NGO monitoring human rights. 
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violence becomes an issue. Police officers and company staff can suddenly demand top-up 
cash above what they had initially agreed on or people refuse to pay the bribes. Disagreements 
occur and turn into confrontations that provoke policemen to aim their weapons at the very 
people who had been co-conspirators a moment earlier (Marato 2011; York 2011b). Onesmo 
Olengurumwa, researcher at the LHRC: “When there are agreements between the community 
and the police, and the police fail to honour it, that’s when the conflicts start.” “If they’ve 
made a deal to collect rocks from the mine, how can you call them intruders?” (York 2011b). 
In this view, corruption is perceived as legitimising the claims of the artisanal miners of access 
to the gold within the concessions of ABG. 
8.6.  Perceptions of circumstances
The ASM claims of legitimacy to mine must be considered in the context of poverty, lack of 
alternative sources of income and the value of gold.
8.6.1.  Poverty and lack of alternative sources of income
Even though per capita income in the Tarime district is a little above average it is still below 
the poverty line (see chapter 1). According to the theoretical framework, legitimacy is related 
to how the actors themselves see these circumstances. A villager named Mang’era Saidi 
Mang’era is quoted:
We no longer have land for cultivation, we have lost our local mines, now there are 
no pastures because the mine has almost taken the whole land ... we have no sources 
of income, most us are amputated and we are living only through God's wishes 
(Mlowe & Olengurumwa 2011: 21)
Nyagabure Chacha, a villager living close to the waste rock piles is simply quoted: 
“These people have nothing,” “They have no resources to survive.” (Simpson 2010). 
Neyakema Mwita (Age 39) see no other means of earning a livelihood besides returning to the 
mining site: "I have a wife. If I don't go there, how else will I eat?" (Wright &  Edwards 2011). 
At the same time they see the company earning huge profits. Charles Mwera, Former Member 
of the Parliament: 
…. people want areas for mining whose livelihood depended on mining that has been 
taken, are yet to be compensated as result some still live in the mining sites thus 
affected by mining explosives and chemicals through air and water pollution… are 
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being injured and some killed….the feeling that their resources are being taken by the 
foreign investor in cooperation with the government leaders …. (Mwikwabe 2011: 
49)
Villagers have complained to the Deputy Minister that the mine has failed to support 
development, artisanal miners and small-scale projects in the area (Jacob 2012). Chacha M 
(age 49) on how he has been affected by investment: “…we don’t have income because I used 
to work as miner but now I am not allowed we are waiting to see if the state will relocate new 
place where we can be free to dig gold ourselves…” (Mwikwabe: 2011: 35-36). This clearly 
reflects the lack of government support to the artisanal miners. Many intruders say they would 
happily give up their invasions and switch to small-scale mining if they could (York 2011b). 
These claims are directed towards the government in order to support them as promised but 
these quotes underlines a specific content of the claim of accessing the gold. They want to be 
able to (legally) mine gold themselves as they used to. The claims should be regarded in 
relation to the historical legitimacy and support the argument of this thesis, that access to the 
gold in North Mara is the central claim of the artisanal miners and therefore a crucial feature 
of the ASM-LSM conflict. This claim is different from merely wanting to benefit from the 
gold production, as is a common feature of community claims in Mine-Community conflicts 
(see chapter 3). This difference underlines the  simple, yet important particularity of the ASM-
LSM conflict in this case. 
8.6.2.  Economically value of gold
The value of gold have been increasing for decades (see chapter 1). From studies of ASM in 
Tanzania it is found that ASM is generally perceived as a potentially profitably career choice 
by people in Tanzania (Bryceson et al. 2010: 366; Bryceson & Jønsson 2010: 383; Fisher et al. 
2009: 34). Since the discovery of gold in the area there has been little agriculture. Instead, 
members of the community have relied on ASM and have been able to benefit from these gold 
mining activities. Nelson Charles (age 22) represents a tangible evidence. Having worked 
within the ABG mining concession for three years, he owns a motorcycle, a television, a DVD 
player and a $500 Nokia smartphone. He has spent thousands of dollars to buy a plot of land 
in his hometown, and he plans to build a house there for his family (York 2011b). The rewards 
of illegal mining activities are therefore considered worth the risk of getting hurt or killed by 
security guards or the police. Gold symbolises the only (profitable) economic activity in the 
area. The huge profitability of gold equally makes it hard for the company not to continue 
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their operation of the NMGM, in spite of the problems.
8.7.  (the conflict as) A clash of claims 
This analysis has identified articulated claims of access to the gold resources in North Mara by 
the three stakeholders; the Tanzanian state, the LSM company ABG, and the artisanal miners 
living around the NMGM. Through this study it as been argued that the conflicting claims of 
the stakeholders are based on diverse notions of rights and legitimacy to access and exploit the 
same gold deposits. These claims manifest themselves physically as protest actions, 
sometimes violently, when the different claims of the stakeholders clash. Violence is a 
physical expression of claim-making and protest, based on feelings of outrage and anger, from 
wrong-doings and violation of expectations. 
The claims and the legitimacy to these claims, of the current and the former artisanal miners, 
are pragmatic and based upon historical legitimacy through historical occupation of land and 
of ASM activities, as well as previous mineral and (customary) land rights, which were 
“forced” sold. Legally their claims to access the gold contains a misconception of mineral and 
land rights, by which the artisanal miners perceive land and minerals (or rights to these) as the 
same. However, there is no legal support for this as minerals are not included in land rights, 
and even though The Land Act 1999 and The Village Land Act 1999 both contains provisions 
for compensation for lost income and profits, it does not include compensation for the loss of 
ASM opportunities. 
The artisanal miners believe that their rights to both minerals and land were unrighteously 
handed over to the mining company under dubious circumstances, that excluded many 
villagers, who should have been part of the negotiations. Furthermore, they feel that 
compensation for their loss of rights and resettlement has been inadequate. This perception of 
wrong-doing by both the company and the state legitimise their protests in their own view, 
with a strong feeling of anger and outrage. It also de-legitimises the claims of ABG, as the 
legal requirements of transfer of the rights have not yet been complied with, hence the legal 
claims of the artisanal miners are still valid and legitimacy to these claims is consolidated. The 
claims are not differentiated sharply between legal and non-legal legitimacy as illustrated by 
the following two quotes. Matare S (age 41) from the Nyamongo village when asked of 
whether he was aware that the NMGM is working under legal guidance: “…people talking 
about contract but we don’t know what is contract we need back our gold…” (Mwikwabe 
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2011: 36). Milima M (age 45):  “…how can you end conflict, the damaged relationship will  
never be repaired this Company is taking our gold and the government is protecting 
Company… of all these misery…” (Mwikwabe 2011: 54). The notion of “our gold” and 
hereby right to access this gold, is very apparent in these two quotes and has also been clearly 
displayed throughout this analysis. This way of claiming is not unique to the North Mara case, 
however. Findings from a study in Ghana by Aubynn (2009) have found similar claims and 
argues: “...that they [the artisanal miners in Ghana] have long sustained themselves on mining 
local mineral resources, well before the arrival of LSM operations; and, that the latter seizes  
control of lands and deprives local people of their rightful access to minerals and other 
natural resources.“ (Aubynn 2009: 65). This thesis has elaborated on how the artisanal miners 
in North Mara perceive this rightful access. 
Very differently from the artisanal miners, ABG/Barrick adheres strictly to legal claims by 
their acquisition of mineral rights granted to them by the Tanzanian state. These provide them 
with exclusive right of ownership of the mineral recovered as well as complete power to 
dispose them. Together with the transferred land rights, by which the people who lived there 
prior to the mine could be legally displaced and relocated, the mineral rights grant ABG de 
facto property rights in regard to their concessions. These rights are accompanied by a strong 
notion of the sanctity of property rights, which is shared by the government, making it not 
only acceptable but legitimate to defend the mining concessions and the minerals within and 
to do so with force if necessary.  
The Tanzanian government is managing the minerals on behalf of the Tanzanian people and 
can, on this ground, grant mineral rights to Tanzanian artisanal and small scale miners, as well 
as LSM companies including foreign corporations. The legitimacy of the claims of the 
government to access the gold is fundamentally legal, but since the liberalisation of the mining 
sector, the government has chosen not to be directly involved in mining operations and instead 
let others exploit the mineral wealth. In spite of the first come, first served principle embedded 
in the legal framework, LSM companies such as ABG/Barrick are preferred to grant mineral 
rights to. The notion of a positive relationship between LSM and development is what 
legitimises this although some authors, as explained in the previous chapter, argue that the 
mining reforms were ultimately imposed by the WB and the IMF and therefore not a notion of 
the government itself. Participating in this discussion is beyond the aim of this thesis but it 
suggests that the Tanzanian government is forced to support claims of foreign LSM companies 
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to profit from their mineral wealth.  
On the ground of (perceived) legal legitimacy, ABG as well as the Tanzanian government, 
criminalise and de-legitimise the artisanal miners and their claims to access the gold. The 
artisanal miners are branded as simple criminals, breaking the law, violating the rights of the 
company, and acting violently against ABG personnel. This criminalisation further justifies the 
use of force to defend the mining concessions. 
This analysis have described how the artisanal miners are involved in corruption by getting 
inside information from ABG employees about mineral rich waste rocks, and bribing the 
police to get access to these. To the artisanal miners this arrangement is perceived as a 
legitimate way to access the gold and can be considered an articulation of their claims to 
access the gold. At the same time bribing, in their view, legitimises the claim of access to the 
gold itself, although some have questioned the fairness of this arrangement. From this 
perspective the physical confrontations are results of someone not complying with this 
arrangement by refusing to pay the bribe, increasing the payment-demand or open fire despite 
being paid. ABG, on the other hand, is articulating this as a criminalisation of the artisanal 
miners, hereby de-legitimising their claims. 
8.7.1.  Target and direction of claims 
As argued in relation to the theoretical framework the claims contains a target and a direction, 
which are the form of redress sought in the claims, aimed at the actor responsibly for carrying 
this out (see chapter 4). The company is targeting its claims at the state as the body 
responsible for ensuring and safeguarding its mining rights. The claims are directed at 
measures to improve law and order, and through this, the safeguarding of the company's 
continued and unrestricted access to the gold. 
The target and direction of the claims of the artisanal miners are multifaceted and less simple. 
The claims are targeted at the company as well as the government, seeking measures to restore 
legal ASM activities to access the gold. The gold deposits are rich and might potentially 
benefit the local communities much longer than the ten years it is expected to be profitable to 
ABG, as their amount of gold productions is far smaller than LSM88. There are artisanal 
88 However the proved size of the NMGM deposits is larger than the amount of gold extractable to the artisanal 
miners do to their simple methods of extraction, limiting the depth to which they can extract from (see 
chapter 2). 
59
claims targeted at ABG and directed at improved employment opportunities. Other artisanal 
miners prefer to be able to mine ore themselves. Such claims are instead targeted at the 
government, directed at getting the government to actively support them and start designating 
areas where they can extract gold themselves. The government is a target of claims but the 
measures and direction is neither removal of the government nor any other revolution-type 
demand or far-stretching changes in the legislation, as the SMT-agenda would otherwise 
assume (as discussed in chapter 4). Rather they want the government to simply abide there 
own law and start supporting ASM activities, as stated in The Mineral Policy 1997 and they 
are in effect contesting the government's management of the natural wealth as unconstitutional 
and not benefiting the people. The advantages of the concepts of protest and claim-making are 
clear in this view, as it does not assume any normative agenda, which traditional SMT on the 
other hand tends to do (as argued in chapter 4). 
Similarly, a direction close to status quo is apparent in relation to the bribing arrangement by 
which artisanal miners gain access to the mining site. In spite of some instability of this 
arrangement, some of the artisanal miners perceive it as a legit way of accessing the gold, 
given the circumstances. Others however argue that this arrangement is unfair, not letting the 
less resourceful gaining access to the gold. The slightly different directions of the claims of 
the artisanal miners indicate that the artisanal miners as a stakeholder group is less coherent 
than assumed. 
The direction of the claims is not to be confused with wishes of ending the human rights 
abuses by the security guards (no matter the reality of these) or stop the pollution (no matter 
the reality of this) or ending of land expropriation. These issues are fuelling the conflict but 
are not directly related to the claims of the artisanal miners to access the gold. Instead, the 
direction of the claims emphasises a particularity of the ASM-LSM conflict in North Mara, 
which not only separates it from the broader Mine-Community conflict but points to why 
impact studies, CSR-approaches and Resource Conflict Theory are inadequate to understand 
the basis of the ASM-LSM conflict as well. 
Besides being a target of claims the Tanzanian government can be considered a pseudo 
claimant. As opposed to the other stakeholders, the government is not articulating claims to 
access the gold itself. This was abandoned when the mining sector was liberalised, as seen 
from the previous chapter. Instead the government lets LSM companies extract the gold under 
state regulation, collecting taxes and royalties, and is strongly defending the claims of ABG, 
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while de-legitimising any claims of the artisanal miners. The government is therefore, better 
regarded as a source of legitimacy than a claimant in its own right. 
The many de-legitamising claims identified, which are just as apparent as the claims of 
legitimacy, are findings not far from those of Mwaipopo et al. (2004) arguing that conflict 
between LSM and local communities is caused by “...misguided preconceptions and strong  
feelings regarding each other and their alleged rights.“ (Mwaipopo et al. 2004: 26). However, 
this would indicate that the conflict would end (or at least be reduced) if these preconceptions 
and feelings were guided or corrected, and it ignores the very basis of claims.
8.7.2.  The construction of claims
Each stakeholder's perceived legitimacy to claims of access to the gold by are socially 
constructed in relation to the historical changes, that have affected these claims, and the 
context in which these claims are articulated. The Tanzanian state has experienced the post-
independence era and the subsequent economic decline, followed by liberalisation and reform 
of the mining legislation to change this. The company was attracted by the new legislation 
offering attractive policies for FDI in mining operations in a mineral rich country that was 
previously fending off foreign investors. Additionally ABG/Barrick was not involved in the 
original process of setting up the NMGM, but has inherited the contract through the 
overtaking of another mining company. The artisanal miners in the area have experienced the 
benefits of the gold, even acquiring legal rights to these claims, and then being removed from 
the area and dispossessed of (legal) mining opportunities, seeing a foreign company benefiting 
from the gold instead. This change has strengthened their perception of legitimacy. The 
historical-grounded legitimacy in terms of cultural attachment to the land and their history of 
ASM activities has been strengthened, even though the ASM activities in the area to many are 
a recent phenomenon. 
To the artisanal miners legitimacy of their claims is constructed in a complex interrelationship 
with how they perceive their situation. To them their (economic) situation has become worse 
after the NMGM was established. As argued in the first chapter of this thesis, ASM can be 
regarded as being a poverty-driven livelihood activity but also a way of escaping poverty. 
People in the villages around the mine see the police as corrupt and dishonest (Guardian 
2011). Still, in the context of poverty, collaboration with them is considered a legitimate mean 
to access the gold.  
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To Carstens & Hilson (2009) protest by artisanal should be seen as struggling to escape 
poverty, which is often misinterpreted as defiance and results in their being branded as 
criminals (Carstens & Hilson 2009: 307). However, this perspective fails to regard the 
legitimacy embedded in the protests. The artisanal miners have a strong sense of legitimate 
claims to access the gold, constructed under circumstances of widespread poverty, lack of 
support from the government and perceived illegal dispossession of rights. Under these 
circumstances illegal entrance into the ABG concession is justified, even with means of 
violence. ABG has been granted legal mining rights by the state, and has additionally acquired 
land rights, which grants them de facto property rights. Under this notion of rights ABG claim 
exclusive access to the gold within its concession. The Tanzanian government is very 
supportive of the claims of ABG and both are ultimately justifying the killings of artisanal 
miners on the ground that they were violating these claims. However, ABG/Barrick have 
failed to acknowledge the claims of the artisanal miners to access to the gold, and simply 
dismiss any actions in that directions as being illegal acts of criminals. At the same time ABG 
is trying to compensate the villagers for their loss of lands and working opportunities, again 
failing to acknowledge the dispossession of ASM activities experience by the local 
communities. 
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9.  Conclusion
The conflict in North Mara,Tanzania can be regarded as a clash of claims manifested in 
physical and violent confrontations between the artisanal miners, the mining company African 
Barrick Gold (ABG), and the Tanzanian government. These three stakeholders all articulate 
disparate claims of access to the gold. Each stakeholder perceive their claims to be legitimate 
through their individual perceptions of circumstances, under which their means to secure these 
claims and accessing the gold are justified. The state deploys police to the mining site, ABG 
hires security guards to secure the mining concession, and the artisanal miners trespasses onto 
the mining site to access the gold they used to mine by themselves, which leads to violent 
confrontations between the artisanal miners on one hand, and police and security guards on 
the other. These confrontations are intensified articulations of the claims of the stakeholders 
that clash. The intensified and violent articulations arise from feelings of rights being violated. 
The legitimacy to the claims of the artisanal miners is based on historical occupation of land 
and of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) activities, as well as on the mineral rights 
previously granted to them by the government. The artisanal miners accuse the government 
and the company of having deprived them of their mineral rights and land illegally, hereby 
strengthening their claims. The artisanal miners do not distinguish sharply between legal and 
non-legal legitimacy but simply perceive the gold as their entitled right and feel that the 
government supports the mining company in “stealing” their gold.  
The company on the other hand has been granted exclusive mineral rights by the government, 
and the area where the mine has been established, has been reserved by the same government 
for this operation. This effectively grants the company de facto property rights over their 
mining concession legitimising their claims on strictly legal terms. 
The Tanzanian government is not directly a claimant but legitimises the right of ABG to 
access the gold by a notion of a positive relationship between LSM and development. By this 
notion informal ASM activities are considered as not contributing to Tanzanian development 
and all artisanal miners trying to make a living are criminalised as intruders and trespassers. 
The legitimacy is socially constructed in relation to the stakeholders' individual perceptions of 
circumstances changing (or creating) their access to the gold and of their own situation. The 
villagers in the area carried out artisanal mining activities before any mining company came to 
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the area. Liberalisation reforms of the mining sector formulated by the government however, 
have changed access for all three stakeholders as they introduced new mining policies to 
attract foreign direct investments (FDI) and to formalise artisanal mining. The Tanzanian 
government outsourced the extraction of gold to foreign companies and small-scale miners, 
which has dispossessed the local communities of ASM opportunities and instead criminalised 
artisanal miners. At the same time the legal framework is giving preferential treatment to 
ABG, enabling them to harvest huge profits. This occurs in an area with severe poverty, and 
the local communities have depended on ASM as a livelihood strategy, which has contributed 
to a feeling among the artisanal miners of being wronged, which in their view legitimise their 
illegal activities within the ABG mining concession. Legitimacy to the claims of each of the 
stakeholders are therefore constructed under circumstances that they perceive very differently 
and inevitably the claims to access the same gold deposits clash with each other. 
Concluding that the conflict is a clash of claims to access gold might at first seem elementary 
but it reveals a fundamental cause of the conflict which other authors have not considered. 
Authors have pointed to different causes of the conflict such as ambiguity within the mining 
legislation, unfair treatment of artisanal miners, different perceptions of land and mining 
rights, and misconceptions among the stakeholders of each others rights. This thesis 
challenges these arguments as incomplete, ignoring the aspect of perceived legitimacy, and 
moreover failing to recognise that the main claim of all three stakeholders is access to the gold
ABG has also failed to acknowledge this claim of the artisanal miners. ABG is trying to 
compensate the villagers for their loss of lands and work, assuming that this will end the 
conflict. However, ABG has not recognised that because of the dependency and attachment to 
ASM activities of the local communities, the mining operation has not only dispossessed the 
artisanal miners of access to the gold but of livelihood as well.
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania has said: “...law and justice are 
totally different.” “Simply because Barrick signed a contract with the government doesn’t  
make everything right.” (Matinyi 2011). 
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